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In the 1950s and 1960s, in many parts of the country, a professor could be 
fired or never hired if he refused to denounce communism or declare loyalty to 
the United States Constitution.  The University of California (also referred to as 
“UC”) system took the lead in enforcing such loyalty oaths.1  These oaths were 
challenged all the way up to the United States Supreme Court and were soundly 
rejected, establishing the centrality of academic freedom and open inquiry on 
the university campus.2 
So why are loyalty oaths making their resurgence in the form of mandatory 
diversity statements?  Universities have begun requiring faculty members to 
declare fealty to a particular worldview and approach towards matters of 
 
 1. Robert G. Sproul, President of the University of California, drafted a loyalty oath to be 
taken by all university staff in 1949.  Robert Greenberg, The Loyalty Oath at the University of 
California: A Report on Events, 1949–1958, FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT ARCHIVES, http://www.
fsm-a.org/stacks/AP_files/APLoyaltyOath.html.  The following year, the State of California 
adopted the Levering Act, which required all public employees to take a loyalty oath.  Id.  
Ultimately, twenty-six faculty members were dismissed, and thirty-seven others resigned in protest.  
Id. 
 2. See infra Section I 
Fall 2021] In the Name of Diversity 517 
diversity.3  Campus diversity bureaucrats appear to miss the irony that these 
statements are being deployed in the name of diversity.  In another historical 
irony, this trend has once again been spearheaded by the UC system. 
While these diversity statements were initially conceived of as just an 
additional factor to be weighed along with academic merit, teaching, and service, 
the purpose and use of these statements has radically morphed over the past few 
years.  At some UC campuses today, a prospective professor who does not 
produce a diversity statement that satisfies diversity bureaucrats will be excluded 
from consideration without a review of any other aspect of his application.4  The 
rubrics that are being deployed engage in blatant viewpoint discrimination as 
well as a viewpoint-based evaluation of the applicant’s research.5  It is unlikely, 
for instance, that an aspiring professor who shares the viewpoint of Chief Justice 
Roberts that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race,”6 would be hired.  Can a university employ 
such viewpoint-based criterion in its hiring process, or do the First Amendment 
rights of individual professors foreclose such viewpoint-based discrimination? 
This question turns on a long-standing debate that has divided courts and 
academics across the country.  Do professors have a personal First Amendment 
right in their academic profession, or do free speech rights in academia extend 
only collectively to academic faculty and departments?  The Supreme Court’s 
curtailment of public employee speech in Garcetti v. Ceballos has only 
exacerbated this lingering tension.7  This article begins with a recap of the 
ongoing debate. 
Many of the battles over faculty speech have traditionally concerned speech 
or conduct in the classroom.  Classroom speech raises difficult concerns over 
whether the professor is speaking of his own accord or merely acting as an agent 
of the University.8  Other fights have concerned professors’ publications of 
particularly controversial and offensive speech, such as when Ward Churchill 
described workers in the World Trade Center as “little Eichmanns.”9  These 
cases have involved individualized assessments as to whether a particular faculty 
member was likely to be disruptive or harmful to a university’s mission or 
otherwise violated university protocol.10  In these cases, the university has often, 
but not always, prevailed. 
 
 3. See infra Section II. 
 4. See infra Section II. 
 5. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 6. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 US 701, 748 (2007). 
 7. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).  See infra Section I.D. 
 8. See infra Section I.C.1. 
 9. Associated Press, Professor Fired After 9/11-Nazi Comparison, NBC NEWS (July 24, 
2007), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19940243/ns/us_news-education/t/professor-fired-after-nazi-
comparison/#.Xdwk3FdKgzw. 
 10. See, e.g., Churchill. v. Univ. of Colo. at Boulder, 285 P.3d 986, 991–92 (Colo. 2012).  
The University of Colorado found that Churchill’s essay “did not engender imminent violence or 
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The introduction of the mandatory diversity statement shifts the battleground 
away from the classroom and away from the publication of particularly 
controversial faculty speech towards systematic evaluation of viewpoint that is 
largely unrelated to classroom activities and unrelated to whether the viewpoint 
is expressed in a particularly offensive or divisive fashion.  Surprisingly, thus 
far scholarly attention to this new shift has been limited,11 and public attention 
muted,12 although that appears to be changing.13  This is perhaps because the 
 
unduly interfere with university operations, constituted protected free speech and therefore could 
not serve as the grounds for a for-cause dismissal of a tenured employee.”  Id. at 992.  However, 
the University also investigated several other complaints of academic misconduct and found good 
cause for his removal.  Id. at 992–93. 
 11. Professor Erica Goldberg discussed diversity statements in an article published in the FIU 
Law Review in the spring of 2019.  See generally Erica Goldberg, ”Good Orthodoxy” and the 
Legacy of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV. 639 (2019).  However, Professor Goldberg’s discussion of 
diversity statements is limited for two reasons.  First, she does not focus on the specifics of how 
these statements are being used (and her article was likely written before some of the most recent 
and more troubling developments).  Second, her article is not focused on the central question that 
this article seeks to address, which is whether diversity statements impinge on the First Amendment 
rights of faculty members.  Professor Goldberg focuses instead on a more generalized issue of 
compelled speech, rooted in the Supreme Court’s Barnette decision.  Id. at 639–40. 
 12. Jeffrey Flier, the former dean of Harvard Medical School, sent out a tweet critical of 
mandatory diversity statements in November 2018.  See Colleen Flaherty, Making a Statement on 
Diversity Statements: Former Harvard Dean’s Tweet Against Required Faculty Diversity 
Statements Sets off Debate, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/
news/2018/11/12/former-harvard-deans-tweet-against-required-faculty-diversity-statements-sets-
debate.  He followed up this tweet with a column in the Chronicle of Higher Education in January 
2019.  See generally Jeffrey Flier, Against Diversity Statements, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 3, 
2019), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Against-Diversity-Statements/245400.  A response was 
published a few days later.  See generally Charlotte M. Canning & Richard J. Reddick, In Defense 
of Diversity Statements, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.chronicle.com/
article/In-Defense-of-Diversity/245463.  In 2019, a few opinion pieces and articles focused on the 
use of these statements at the University of California, including an op-ed in the Daily Caller by 
the author Daniel Ortner.  See Daniel Ortner, Don’t Expect Diversity of Thought at University of 
California, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 24, 2019), https://dailycaller.com/2019/09/24/ortner-diversity-
university-california; see also Dan Walters, UC Faculty “Diversity Statement” Mandate a Political 
Litmus Test, DESERT SUN: CALMATTERS COMMENTARY (July 28, 2019), https://www.desert
sun.com/story/opinion/columnists/2019/07/28/uc-faculty-diversity-statement-policy-litmus-test-
dan-walters-calmatters-commentary/1843207001/.  Attention to the issue picked up in 2020.  See, 
e.g., Daniel Ortner, What is UC Davis Hiding About Its Use of Diversity Statements?, THE HILL 
(Feb. 3, 2020), https://thehill.com/opinion/education/480603-what-is-uc-davis-hiding-about-its-
use-of-diversity-statements; Michael Poliakoff, How Diversity Screening at the University of 
California Could Degrade Faculty Quality, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/michaelpoliakoff/2020/01/21/how-diversity-screening-at-the-university-of-california-could-
degrade-faculty-quality/#2c0a4bf41598; Robby Soave, Berkeley Weeded Out Job Applicants Who 
Didn’t Propose Specific Plans to Advance Diversity, REASON (Feb. 3, 2020), https://reason.com/
2020/02/03/university-of-california-diversity-initiative-berkeley/. 
 13. Abigail Thompson, a vice president of the American Mathematics Society (AMS) and 
Chair of Mathematics at UC Davis, wrote a column in the December issue of AMS Notices 
critiquing diversity statements and labeling them a modern version of the loyalty oath.  See Abigail 
Thompson, A Word From . . . , 66 NOTICES AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 1778, 1778–79 (2019), 
https://www.ams.org/journals/notices/201911/rnoti-p1778.pdf.  Her column triggered a sharp 
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extent to which universities plan to rely on these statements is only slowly 
coming into focus.  This article, therefore, breaks new ground by painting a 
detailed picture of how diversity statements are being utilized.14  It relies on 
documents received from public record requests and conversations with 
concerned faculty at UC schools and shows the extent these diversity statements 
have become tools of viewpoint discrimination.15  It identifies four key concerns 
with the use of mandatory diversity statements: the overt role that race and 
gender plays, the risk of viewpoint-based discrimination, the risk of viewpoint-
based evaluation of academic research, and the employment of a requirement 
that professors take affirmative steps above and beyond their job duties to 
promote diversity. 
After laying this rather startling foundation, this article then advances three 
closely related arguments concerning First Amendment protections for 
university professors and prospective faculty against discrimination by their 
academic institutions.16  First, the use of diversity statements is symptomatic of 
several shifting trends in higher education that threaten to undermine 
professorial speech rights.  These trends show why it is vital that courts 
recognize a professor’s individual right to First Amendment protection at the 
university and accord meaningful protection to that right.17  Relatedly, these 
same trends show why Garcetti cannot and should not be applied to a professor’s 
speech outside of the classroom (including academic writing, conference 
presentations, and purely extramural speech).18 
Finally, while a university must maintain the right to evaluate faculty 
members based on their research contributions and their fit for a particular 
department, a university crosses the line when it imposes the equivalent of an 
ideological litmus test that excludes candidates who do not share a particular 
viewpoint.19  While courts have often been reluctant to interfere in the academic 
selection process, the abuse of diversity statements shows a need for more 
 
backlash, including calls to fire her or remove her from her position on the AMS.  See, e.g., Chad 
Topaz, Diversity Statements in Hiring, the American Mathematical Society, and UC Davis, QSIDE 
(Nov. 19, 2019), https://qsideinstitute.org/2019/11/19/diversity-statements-in-hiring-the-american-
mathematical-society-and-uc-davis/.  On the other hand, hundreds of individuals signed a letter 
supportive of Thompson as a rejoinder to her critics.  See Scott Aaronson et al., Letter to the Editor: 
Responses to “A Word from . . . Abigail Thompson,” AM. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 9 (Dec. 2019), 
https://www.ams.org/journals/notices/202001/rnoti-o1.pdf.  Abigail Thompson followed up with 
an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal and the University offered a response.  See Abigail Thompson, 
The University’s New Loyalty Oath, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
the-universitys-new-loyalty-oath-11576799749; Renetta Garrison Tull & Gary S. May, UC Davis 
Defends Its “Diversity Statements”, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uc-
davis-defends-its-diversity-statements-11577392382. 
 14. See infra Section II. 
 15. See infra Section II. 
 16. See infra Sections III and IV. 
 17. See infra Section III. 
 18. See infra Section IV. 
 19. See infra Section IV. 
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careful thinking about how universities can engage in content or viewpoint-
based distinctions.20  This article accordingly argues that viewpoint-based 
distinctions are particularly pernicious and should be subject to heightened 
scrutiny.  Even content-based distinctions must also be carefully evaluated to 
ensure that they do not serve as a smokescreen for viewpoint-based 
discrimination.  The article ends by putting forward criterion that should be 
considered when evaluating a university’s actions that potentially discriminate 
based on content or viewpoint.21  Mandatory diversity statements fall short of 
each of these.  Hopefully, these criteria will serve as a starting point for further 
dialogue on this vital topic. 
I.  HISTORY OF PROFESSORIAL FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION22 
A.  Foundational Supreme Court Precedent23 
Protection for the free speech rights of teachers and professors got off to a 
rather inauspicious start.24  In Adler v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
 
 20. See infra Section IV. 
 21. See infra Section V. 
 22. The First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech is distinguishable from academic 
freedom.  Scholars have debated extensively as to whether academic freedom is part of “the larger 
class of rights enjoyed by citizens of a free society,” or whether it is solely based in “professional 
autonomy” and professional norms.  Henry Reichman, Academic Freedom and the Common Good: 
A Review Essay, 7 AAUP J. ACAD. FREEDOM, 2016, at 2, https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/
Reichman_1.pdf (summarizing the debate at great length).  The minimalist perspective suggests 
that “academic freedom [i]s little more than a guild slogan that speaks to the desire of the academic 
profession to run its own shop.”  Id. at 3. (quoting STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM TO REVOLUTION (2014)).  Under this minimalist lens, 
professors are not entitled to claim any right or entitlement to producing academic knowledge free 
from institutional restraints.  On the other hand, other scholars emphasize the individual and rights 
protecting the nature of academic freedom and argue that “academic freedom is a category of 
political freedom,” which protects “[t]he liberty to speak one’s mind.”  David Bromwich, Academic 
Freedom and Its Opponents, in WHO’S AFRAID OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 27, 27–28 (Akeel 
Bilgrami & Jonathan R. Cole eds., 2015). 
This article is primarily concerned with legal protections that exist to protect professorial speech, 
rather than professional protections such as those extended by the AAUP.  As will be discussed 
shortly, the Supreme Court has folded the concept of “academic freedom” within the fold of the 
First Amendment.  Such legal protection of academic freedom is necessary and is becoming 
increasingly necessary in light of trends in academia.  In keeping with the Supreme Court’s pattern, 
the phrase “academic freedom” will be used to refer to First Amendment freedoms. 
 23. Whole articles can and have been written about the Supreme Court’s historical treatment 
of faculty speech and about how circuit courts have applied this precedent.  This article is not 
intended to comprehensively cover all these cases.  Instead, this overview is focused on two themes.  
First, the tension between the First Amendment rights of individual faculty members and academic 
institutions, and second, what happens when academic institutions attempt to impose content- or 
viewpoint-based restrictions on faculty members. 
 24. This “extremely narrow interpretation of the first amendment” hearkened back to 
Blackstone’s Commentaries.  William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First 
Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, LAW & 
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flatly rejected a challenge to a New York law that forbade any members of 
“subversive groups,” such as the Communist Party, from becoming a teacher.25  
The Supreme Court explained that while the First Amendment protects an 
individual’s “right under our law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they 
will,” the law did not guarantee a “right to work for the State in the school system 
on their own terms.”26  Accordingly, the school board did no harm to the First 
Amendment when it forbade members of “subversive groups” from teaching.27  
Moreover, since “[a] teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom” and 
“shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live,” the 
school had the right to ensure “fitness and loyalty” and could base its 
determination on “the organizations and persons with whom they associate.”28 
Justices Black and Douglas both voiced powerful and prescient dissents.  
Justice Black voiced his concern that these kinds of laws “make it dangerous . . 
. to think or say anything except what a transient majority happen to approve at 
the moment” and his conviction that the First Amendment “rests on the belief 
that government should leave the mind and spirit of man absolutely free.”29  
Justice Douglas explained that “[t]he public school is in most respects the cradle 
of our democracy” and that freedom of speech and thought must be protected.30  
But when “suspicion fills the air and holds scholars in line for fear of their jobs, 
there can be no exercise of the free intellect.”31  Such a result is contrary to “the 
pursuit of truth which the First Amendment was designed to protect.”32 
Within just a few years, Justices Black and Douglas would find themselves in 
the majority.33  The reconsideration of Adler began with a case only loosely 
related to public education that nevertheless gave the Court a chance to deploy 
a more robust interpretation of the First Amendment.  In Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of an individual who 
refused to answer questions asked by the New Hampshire Attorney General as 
part of an investigation into left wing organizations in the state.34  One of the 
lines of questioning concerned Sweezy’s lecturing at the University of New 
 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 79, 83.  It was also pithily expressed by then Judge Oliver 
Wendell Holmes: “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.”  McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 
(Mass. 1892). 
 25. Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 489, 496 (1952). 
 26. Id. at 492. 
 27. Id. at 489, 493. 
 28. Id. at 493. 
 29. Id. at 496–97 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 30. Id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 510. 
 32. Id. at 511. 
 33. The shift in perspective on First Amendment issues was not limited to academic freedom 
but instead impacted most aspects of First Amendment jurisprudence.  See generally Van Alstyne, 
supra note 24, at 91. 
 34. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 238, 244–45, 255 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
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Hampshire.  During his class, Sweezy had allegedly extoled the virtues of 
socialism and declared that it was “inevitable in America.”35  A plurality of the 
Supreme Court held “that there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner’s 
liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression—areas in 
which government should be extremely reticent to tread.”36  The Court extolled 
the virtue “of freedom in the community of American universities” and “the vital 
role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth.”37  
While in Adler the Court found that teachers must conform to expected norms 
of “fitness and loyalty,” in Sweezy the plurality instead extoled the necessity of 
open intellectual inquiry: “Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of 
suspicion and distrust.  Teachers and students must always remain free to 
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; 
otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”38  Indeed, the plurality 
emphasized that “[t]o impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in 
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation.”39 
Justice Frankfurter, in his concurrence, also set out one of the enduring 
definitions of academic freedom: 
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is 
most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation.  It is an 
atmosphere in which there prevail “the four essential freedoms” of a 
university—to determine for itself on academic grounds who may 
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be 
admitted to study.40 
A few years later in Shelton v. Tucker, the Supreme Court invalidated an 
Arkansas statute that required all teachers in public schools to file affidavits 
providing the name and address of all organizations they belonged to or 
contributed to within the prior five years as a prerequisite to employment.41  The 
Court once again extolled the importance of academic freedom, emphasizing 
that “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital 
than in the community of American schools.”42  Any “unwarranted inhibition 
upon the free spirit of teachers . . . has an unmistakable tendency to chill that 
free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and 
practice; it makes for caution and timidity in their associations by potential 
 
 35. Id. at 260 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 36. Id. at 250. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 263. (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN AND THE UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND, THE OPEN 
UNIVERSITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 10–12 (Albert van de Sandt Centlivres et al. eds., Johannesburg: 
Witwatersrand Univ. Press, 1957)). 
 41. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480, 490 (1960). 
 42. Id. at 487. 
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teachers.”43  Because the disclosure requirement put “pressure upon a teacher to 
avoid any ties which might displease those who control his professional destiny” 
that was “constant and heavy,” it was an “impairment of constitutional 
liberty.”44 
Justice Frankfurter dissented from the decision, and in his dissent one can see 
early echoes of the debate between the speech rights of individual educators and 
academic institutions that is at the center of this article and the battle over 
diversity statements.  Justice Frankfurter explained that in his view academic 
freedom “in its most creative reaches, is dependent in no small part upon the 
careful and discriminating selection of teachers.”45  Academic hiring decisions 
“must be based upon a comprehensive range of information” and are “a matter 
of fine judgment.”46  Because information about a teacher’s associations might 
be relevant to determining his or her dedication to the job or his or her overall 
qualifications for the position, Justice Frankfurter refused to invalidate the 
statute.47  But he noted that using the information gathered “to further a scheme 
of terminating the employment of teachers solely because of their membership 
in unpopular organizations” would be unconstitutional if proven.48  So for 
Justice Frankfurter, deference was due to academic institutions so long as they 
did not discriminate against a particular viewpoint. 
The trend towards more and more robust protections of academic freedom 
peaked49 a few years later in Keyishian v. Board of Regents.50  Professors at the 
University of Buffalo were required to either sign a certificate or declare under 
oath that they had never been part “of any society or group of persons which 
taught or advocated the doctrine that the Government of the United States or of 
any political subdivisions thereof should be overthrown or overturned by force, 
violence or any unlawful means.”51  Several professors either resigned, were 
fired, or faced imminent termination at the expiration of their contracts.52 
 
 43. Id. (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring)). 
 44. Id. at 486–87. 
 45. Id. at 495–96 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 496. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.  Justice Harlan also wrote a separate dissent.  He similarly emphasized that the 
information sought was legitimate and that it was “impossible to determine a priori the place where 
the line should be drawn between what would be permissible inquiry and overbroad inquiry in a 
situation like this.”  Id. at 498 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  According to Justice Harlan, schools should 
be given wide range to inquire and to take all meaningful factors into account.  See id. at 498–99. 
 49. This review of the Supreme Court’s cases concerning loyalty oaths and investigations into 
subversive elements is not comprehensive, and there are several other decisions which “proved to 
be quite uneventful in the long run.”  Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 112–13.  Professor Alstyne’s 
article is far more comprehensive than space permits me to cover here. 
 50. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
 51. Id. at 592.  Full time professors were required to sign the oath, while a part-time lecturer 
was only required to answer the question under oath.  Id. 
 52. Id. 
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The Supreme Court brusquely rejected application of Adler, noting that 
“pertinent constitutional doctrines have since rejected the premises upon which 
that conclusion rested.”53  It then emphasized that the New York law was vague 
and could encompass “mere advocacy of abstract doctrine” or “mere expression 
of belief.”54  As a result, the law would dramatically chill teaching and research 
endeavors, for “[i]t would be a bold teacher who would not stay as far as possible 
from utterances or acts which might jeopardize his living by enmeshing him in 
this intricate machinery.”55  The law would therefore “stifle ‘that free play of the 
spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice . . . . ‘”56 
The Supreme Court then unambiguously embraced the notion of academic 
freedom: “Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, 
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers 
concerned.”57  Academic freedom “is therefore a special concern of the First 
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the 
classroom,” which “is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”58  The Court’s 
rhetoric went even further: “The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained 
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth 
‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.’”59  The Court further explained that “[b]ecause First Amendment 
freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area 
only with narrow specificity.’”60  Under that standard, New York’s loyalty oath 
could not withstand scrutiny.61 
Keyishian has rightfully been described as a landmark decision and an 
“important rite of passage” for academic freedom.62  After Keyishian, “[t]he 
measured protection of academic freedom from hostile state action had become 
a settled feature of first amendment law.”63 
 
 53. Id. at 595. 
 54. Id. at 600–01. 
 55. Id. at 601.  See also id. at 604 (“When one must guess what conduct or utterance may lose 
him his position, one necessarily will ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . .’”) (quoting Speiser 
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)). 
 56. Id. at 601 (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring)). 
 57. Id. at 603. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (quoting United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 
326 U.S. 1 (1945)). 
 60. Id. at 604 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963)). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 114; see also Elliot Friedman, ”A Special Concern”: The 
Story of Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 38 J. COLL. & U.L. 195, 195 (2011) (“The Court’s decision 
in Keyishian v. Board of Regents did more than vindicate its plaintiffs.  It also fundamentally altered 
First Amendment law.”). 
 63. Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 115. 
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The Supreme Court also expanded the rights of students in public schools and 
universities in a similar fashion by relying on substantially similar rhetoric to 
which it used to defend the right of teachers and professors.64  Hence, in Tinker 
v. Des Moines, the Supreme Court closely linked the two and declared that “First 
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment, are available to teachers and students,” because “[i]t can hardly be 
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom 
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”65 
Up to this point, all of the Supreme Court’s cases discussed have concerned 
speech-adverse policies being implemented by governments or school boards.  
In such cases the Supreme Court has continued to offer robust protection of the 
First Amendment and academic freedom.  For instance, in Board of Education 
v. Pico, the Supreme Court invalidated a school board’s decision to ban several 
books from school libraries.66  The Court, in a plurality opinion that was largely 
joined by Justice Blackmun in his concurrence, emphasized that it had “long 
recognized certain constitutional limits upon the power of the State to control 
even the curriculum and classroom.”67  While school boards “possess significant 
discretion to determine the content of their school libraries,” they could not 
exercise that power “in a narrowly partisan or political manner,” because “[o]ur 
Constitution does not permit the official suppression of ideas.”68  In this case, 
the interest of students to have access to books and the interest of teachers to use 
and encourage reading of those books aligned perfectly.  But the picture is far 
less certain when the right of individual faculty members and the right of 
academic institutions clash.69 
 
 64. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 187–88 (1972) (“The College, acting here as the 
instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views 
expressed by any group to be abhorrent.”); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 US 263, 273–74 (1981) (asking 
whether student groups can be excluded from the public forum “because of the content of their 
speech”). 
 65. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 US 503, 506; see also Van Alstyne, 
supra note 24, at 120. 
 66. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 875 (1982) (plurality opinion). 
 67. Id. at 861. 
 68. Id. at 870–71 (emphasis in original).  Justice Blackmun in his concurrence expressed his 
view that while the state had no “affirmative obligation to provide students with information or 
ideas,” nevertheless “certain forms of state discrimination between ideas are improper” and that 
“the State may not act to deny access to an idea simply because state officials disapprove of that 
idea for partisan or political reasons.”  Id. at 878–79 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis in 
original).  The key for Justice Blackmun was that “school officials may not remove books for the 
purpose of restricting access to the political ideas or social perspectives discussed in them, when 
that action is motivated simply by the officials’ disapproval of the ideas involved.”  Id. at 879–80 
(emphasis in original).  In other words, while the school could “choose one book over another” for 
a variety of reasons, such as which books were more relevant to the curriculum, it could not act 
based on viewpoint discrimination.  Id. at 880.  Schools could not engage in “an intentional attempt 
to shield students from certain ideas that officials find politically distasteful.”  Id. at 882. 
 69. The tension between institutional and individual academic freedom has been described as 
“seriously incompatible and probably ultimately irreconcilable.”  Walter P. Metzger, Profession 
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There were early signs—such as Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Shelton—that 
even stalwart defenders of free speech would be conflicted when faced with a 
clash between the rights of individual professors and their academic 
institutions.70  An even more surprising divergence from free speech protection 
of teachers came from Justice Black just a year after Keyishian.  The majority 
decision in Epperson v. Arkansas concerned the Establishment Clause, which 
the Court concluded prohibited the teaching of creationism in the classroom.71  
Justice Black expressed his grave concern that the majority decision would 
“thrust the Federal Government’s long arm . . . further into state school 
curriculums.”72  Justice Black emphasized that states should be “absolutely free 
to choose their own curriculums for their own schools so long as their action 
does not palpably conflict with a clear constitutional command,” and that the 
state had the “power to withdraw from its curriculum any subject deemed too 
emotional and controversial for its public schools.”73  Justice Black was 
surprisingly dismissive of a teacher’s ability to freely introduce controversial 
topics, declaring, “I am also not ready to hold that a person hired to teach school 
children takes with him into the classroom a constitutional right to teach 
sociological, economic, political, or religious subjects that the school’s 
managers do not want discussed.”74 
In contrast, Justice Stewart in his separate concurrence emphasized that while 
a state would be free “to decide that the only foreign language to be taught in its 
public school system shall be Spanish,” it would not “be constitutionally free to 
punish a teacher for letting his students know that other languages are also 
spoken in the world.”75  By penalizing a teacher for merely “mention[ing] the 
very existence of an entire system of respected human thought,” a state “would 
clearly impinge upon the guarantees of free communication contained in the 
 
and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1267 
(1988).  In a seminal article, Dean Mark G. Yudof described “three . . . faces of academic freedom,” 
and explored how the “personal autonomy face of academic freedom” can come into tension with 
the “institutional face.”  Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of Academic Freedom, 32 LOY. L. REV. 831, 
832, 834, 851-53 (1987). 
 70. See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text. 
 71. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107–09 (1968). 
 72. Id. at 111. 
 73. Id. at 112–13. 
 74. Id. at 113–14.  Justice Black’s position is best contextualized as part of his general 
skepticism of First Amendment rights in the public school setting.  The following year, Justice 
Black wrote a dissenting opinion in the Tinker case warning: 
that if the time has come when pupils of state-supported schools, kindergartens, grammar 
schools, or high schools, can defy and flout orders of school officials to keep their minds 
on their own schoolwork, it is the beginning of a new revolutionary era of permissiveness 
in this country fostered by the judiciary. 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 518 (1969).  As already discussed, 
Justice Black was far more protective of the rights of professors and students in institutions of 
higher education.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 75. Epperson, 393 U.S. at 116 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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First Amendment.”76  So, Justice Stewart would have deferred to the state’s 
determination of its schools’ curriculum and pedagogy, but not at the expense of 
forbidding a teacher from expressing a different perspective.77 
More than a decade after Keyishian, the Supreme Court issued its most 
detailed defense of institutional academic freedom, notably in the context of the 
University of California’s efforts to craft an affirmative action program.  In 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court found that 
a university is protected by the First Amendment in its desire “to make its own 
judgments as to education[,] includ[ing] the selection of its student body.”78  The 
Court relied on Justice Frankfurter’s explication of the “four essential freedoms” 
from Sweezy, and emphasized that these freedoms are “of transcendent value to 
all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.”79  The Court, therefore, 
found that the university had a First Amendment interest in creating a campus 
where students could be exposed “to the ideas and mores of students as diverse 
as this Nation of many peoples.”80 
But the Supreme Court also sounded a necessary note of caution: “Although 
a university must have wide discretion in making the sensitive judgments as to 
who should be admitted, constitutional limitations protecting individual rights 
may not be disregarded.”81  The “fatal flaw” in UC’s “preferential program is its 
disregard of individual rights” and individualized consideration.82  Bakke thus 
stands for the principle that deference to institutional concerns for diversity is 
limited by constitutional restraints that protect individual liberty. 
In several other decisions, the Supreme Court continued to affirm the 
institutional academic freedom rights of universities.  For instance, in Regents 
of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, the Court upheld the University of 
Michigan’s decision to drop a student from a program rather than allow him to 
retake a test he had failed.83  As annotated by one scholar, the Court declared: 
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely 
academic decision . . . they may not override it unless it is such a 
substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate 
that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise 
professional judgment. . . .  Added to our concern for lack of standards 
(there are none obviously provided by the Constitution or elsewhere 
according to which judges or juries can say what norms of academic 
competence are suitable or unsuitable for any university as such) is a 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978). 
 79. Id. (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) and quoting United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)). 
 80. Id. at 313. 
 81. Id. at 314. 
 82. Id. at 320. 
 83. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 215, 227–28 (1985). 
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reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of . . . educational institutions 
and our responsibility to safeguard their academic freedom, “a special 
concern of the First Amendment.”84 
In these cases, and others, academic freedom becomes a shield intended to 
prevent the judiciary from engaging in intensive and intrusive review of the 
actions of the institutional university. 
In his concurrence in Widmar v. Vincent, Justice Stevens propounded a 
particularly robust version of this deference.85  He suggested that “[b]ecause 
every university’s resources are limited, an educational institution must 
routinely make decisions concerning the use of the time and space that is 
available.”86  For instance, it could chose to prioritize “a program that 
illuminates the genius of Walt Disney” over “an amateur performance of 
Hamlet.”87  Similarly, the university could “regard some subjects as more 
relevant to its educational mission than others.”88  But for Justice Stevens, 
deference was nevertheless limited.  The university could not “allow its 
agreement or disagreement with the viewpoint of a particular speaker to 
determine whether access to a forum will be granted.”89  Thus, while the 
university could “prefer[] some subjects over others,” it could not exclude 
competing perspectives: “Quite obviously, however, the University could not 
allow a group of Republicans or Presbyterians to meet while denying Democrats 
or Mormons the same privilege.”90  Under Justice Steven’s standard, in other 
words, a university would be given great deference in content-based judgments, 
but would face aggressive scrutiny for viewpoint-based judgments.91 
 
 84. Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 140 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich., 474 U.S. at 225–
26). 
 85. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277–80 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 86. Id. at 278. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 280. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 281. 
 91. In a small number of additional cases, the Supreme Court has considered professors’ 
individual rights that have abutted against institutional rights.  In those cases, the Court has tended 
to side with the institution.  In Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 
271 (1984), the Supreme Court upheld the exclusive bargaining provisions of the State of 
Minnesota against the claim that exclusive bargaining violated the right of faculty members to 
participate in faculty governance.  Minn. St. Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 273 
(1984).  The Court emphasized that these sessions were “occasions for public employers, acting 
solely as instrumentalities of the State, to receive policy advice from their professional employees” 
and that there was “no constitutional right to force the government to listen to their views.”  Id. at 
282–83.  However, the implications of this case are limited by the fact that it involved faculty 
members claiming the right to have their views heard by the administration, rather than a situation 
where faculty members were reprimanded, criticized, or in any way penalized for their speech.  The 
Court properly concluded that accepting the right to participate in governance “would work a 
revolution in existing government practices.”  Id. at 284.  Moreover, the decision’s pro-union 
sentiment runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions, such as Janus v. AFSCME, 
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), which more highly prioritize individual speech and association rights.  Even 
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Despite decades of ambiguous and inconsistent precedent, the Supreme Court 
has never squarely resolved the central question of whose rights prevail in a 
contest between institutional and individual speech rights.  But it is clear from 
the Court’s precedent that whatever degree of control an academic institution 
has over content, it cannot impose an ideological test on its employees or require 
viewpoint conformity. 
B.  The Pickering Test 
The Supreme Court’s precedent concerning public employees, including 
teachers and professors, is similarly inconclusive with respect to the clash 
between institutional and individual liberty in the academic context. 
In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court considered whether a 
school board could properly terminate a teacher who had written an opinion 
editorial in the local newspaper that was highly critical of a tax increase that the 
school board had proposed.92  The Supreme Court quoted its academic freedom 
decisions in Keyishian and Shelton and emphasized that the premise “that 
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment 
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public 
interest in connection with the operation of the public schools in which they 
work . . . has been unequivocally rejected.”93  The Supreme Court recognized 
that allowing public school teachers to speak out is in the public interest because 
these individuals are often “the members of a community most likely to have 
informed and definite opinions” about significant matters of public concern 
involving the operation of schools.94  However, the Court also recognized that a 
public employee is in a different position than a member of the general public.  
Accordingly, the Court laid out a balancing test “between the interests of the 
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer.”95  Under Pickering there is a strong “public 
interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance,”96 
but this interest must be balanced against the employer’s right to prevent speech 
that would “impede[] the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the 
classroom” or “interfere[] with the regular operation of the schools generally.”97  
Unfortunately, the Pickering case did little to flesh out that balancing test, 
leaving it nearly impossible for lower courts to apply it with any consistency.98 
 
more importantly, there is no indication that the school board would have been entitled to exclude 
certain perspectives based on either content or viewpoint. 
 92. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564–65 (1968). 
 93. Id. at 568. 
 94. Id. at 572. 
 95. Id at 568. 
 96. Id. at 573. 
 97. Id. at 572–73. 
 98. See Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due Process Solution to a 
First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 118–20 (2006) (“Pickering guaranteed a 
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The Court’s subsequent decisions have only furthered the uncertainty.  On the 
one hand, the Supreme Court made clear that the protections of Pickering apply 
to even untenured professors.99  The Court also found that a “public employee 
who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to spread 
his views before the public” is nevertheless protected.100 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court put several additional roadblocks in the 
way of a professor seeking to raise a First Amendment claim.  In Connick v. 
Myers, the Supreme Court emphasized that an employee is only protected when 
speaking about “matters of public concern.”101  The Court has also broadened 
what may be considered in termination decisions to include “whether the 
statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a 
detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty 
and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker’s 
duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise.”102 
The Supreme Court further made it procedurally more difficult for public 
employees to prevail in Pickering-style cases.  In Mt. Healthy City School 
District Board of Education v. Doyle, a non-tenured teacher leaked an internal 
memorandum concerning a new dress code to a radio station and was fired.103  
The teacher had also engaged in other unrelated improper conduct, such as 
making an obscene gesture at two girls.104  The Supreme Court found that a 
public employee first bears a burden to show that constitutionally protected 
speech was a “substantial factor” in the school’s conduct, and then the burden 
shifts to the school board to show that it would have reached the same decision 
 
steady flow of doctrinal disputes for decades to come.”); Jessica Reed, Note, From Pickering to 
Ceballos: The Demise of the Public Employee Free Speech Doctrine, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 95, 98 
(2007) (“[T]he Court’s ruling created a compartmentalization that not only leaves public employees 
vulnerable to retaliation for exposing governmental misconduct or inefficiencies, but also neglects 
the public’s interest in hearing such speech.”); Molly K. Smith, Note, Compelled Investigatory and 
Testimonial Speech: An Overdue Clarification of the Public Employee Speech Doctrine that 
Rehabilitates “All of the Values at Stake,” 101 KY. L.J. 403, 408 (2013) (“As the public employee 
speech doctrine evolved, certain drawbacks of the case-by-case approach of Connick-Pickering 
became apparent.”). 
 99. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597–98 (1972).  Circuit courts have also applied 
Pickering to job applicants.  See Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 866 n.12 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(compiling cases). 
 100. Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979). 
 101. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).  This facet of the Pickering-Conning test 
has been aptly criticized as a “Crank Protection Plan” because under it, “an employee who mouths 
off about matters in which he has no credibility is granted more of a hearing in the public square 
than an employee who actually knows what she is talking about.”  Michael Bérubé, Talking out of 
School: Academic Freedom and Extramural Speech, MLA: PROF. (Winter 2019), https://profess
ion.mla.org/talking-out-of-school-academic-freedom-and-extramural-speech/.  This critique is 
particularly appropriate in light of Garcetti.  See discussion infra Section D. 
 102. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570–73). 
 103. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977). 
 104. Id. at 281–82. 
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in the absence of protected conduct.105  This standard has made it extremely 
difficult for teachers or professors to prevail in disputes with their institutions, 
since the school is simply required to point to non-protected reasons for its 
conduct.  In Waters v. Churchill, the Supreme Court held that an employer is 
merely required to “make a substantial showing that the speech is, in fact, likely 
to be disruptive before it may be punished” rather than showing that the speech 
in question was in fact disruptive.106  These decisions made it substantially more 
difficult for a public employee to prevail in First Amendment claims against his 
employer. 
C.  Protection of Faculty Speech under Pickering 
Under the Pickering standard, lower courts have been all over the map when 
professorial speech rights have been raised.  The decisions largely break down 
into three categories: classroom speech, academic research, and extramural 
speech.  Each will briefly be considered. 
1.  Classroom Speech 
One of the more prominent First Amendment issues to arise in the university 
setting involves professorial speech in the classroom itself.  Courts have 
typically been highly solicitous of the institution’s right to establish its own 
curriculum and pedagogy.  For instance, the Third Circuit has held that “a public 
university professor does not have a First Amendment right to decide what will 
be taught in the classroom,” and that the university is free to “make content-
based decisions when shaping its curriculum.”107 
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit has declared that “the argument that 
teachers have no First Amendment rights when teaching, or that the government 
can censor teacher speech without restriction, is totally unpersuasive.”108  To the 
contrary, the court emphasized that “[b]ecause the essence of a teacher’s role is 
to prepare students for their place in society as responsible citizens, classroom 
instruction will often fall within the Supreme Court’s broad conception of 
‘public concern.’”109  The Sixth Circuit has been particularly protective of the 
individual rights of professors in connection to classroom speech and related 
 
 105. Id. at 287. 
 106. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994). 
 107. Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491–92 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Bradley v. 
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176–77 (3d Cir. 1990) (“Although a teacher’s out-of-
class conduct, including her advocacy of particular teaching methods, is protected . . . her in-class 
conduct is not.”). 
 108. Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 680 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 109. Id. at 679; see also Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 816–17 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Stated 
more broadly, there is a public interest concern involved in the issue of the extent of a professor’s 
independence and unfettered freedom to speak in an academic setting.”); Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. 
Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1055 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a professor’s classroom discussion 
about the uses of hemp was protected speech). 
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activity.  For instance, it held that a professor has “the right to review each of 
his students’ work and to communicate, according to his own professional 
judgment, academic evaluations and traditional letter grades,” and accordingly, 
a university could not order a professor to change a grade to prevent the 
professor from communicating his personal evaluation to the student (although 
the university could change the grade itself).110  In contrast, several other circuits 
have rejected very similar claims regarding grading decisions.111 
Other circuits have a mixed legacy with respect to their handling of classroom 
speech cases.  The Second Circuit has “held that school administrators may limit 
the content of school-sponsored speech so long as the limitations are ‘reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’”112  On the other hand, the Second 
Circuit also rejected the notion that a university could “retaliate[] against [a 
professor] based upon the content of his classroom discourse,” declaring that 
such an action would be “as a matter of law, objectively unreasonable.”113 
By and large, however, faculty members tend to lose their suits against 
universities with great frequency.114  These numbers are in some ways inflated 
in favor of universities by the existence of frivolous complaints and the tendency 
of schools to only contest cases they have predetermined are winnable.115  
Nevertheless, classroom speech appears to be an area where courts are 
particularly prone to defer to academic institutions and their ability to regulate 
the content of what is actually being taught to students.  On the other hand, when 
an administration takes action based on “the content of . . . classroom 
discourse,”116 and particularly the viewpoint of that discourse, Courts have been 
willing to second guess academic actions. 
 
 110. Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 829 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 111. See Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69, 79 (3d Cir. 2001); Keen v. Penson, 970 F.2d 252, 
257 (7th Cir. 1992).  Scholarship has been split on whether grading decisions are protected speech.  
See Jennifer L.M. Jacobs, Note, Grade “A” Certified: The First Amendment Significance of 
Grading by Public University Professors, 87 MINN. L. REV. 813, 814 (2003) (arguing that grading 
is the university’s speech rather than the professor’s speech).  But see Kevin A. Rosenfield, Note, 
Brown v. Armenti and the First Amendment Protection of Teachers and Professors in Grading 
Their Students, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1471, 1474 (2003) (arguing that grading may be protected by 
the First Amendment if pedagogically based). 
 112. Panse v. Eastwood, 303 F. App’x 933, 934–35 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Silano v. Sag 
Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 113. Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 598 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 114. Michael H. LeRoy, How Courts View Academic Freedom, 42 J. COLL. & U.L. 1, 27 
(2016). 
 115. Id. at 40. 
 116. Dube, 900 F.2d at 598. 
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2.  Academic Research 
Just as with cases concerning classroom speech, decisions regarding academic 
research generally come out in favor of the university.117  However, almost none 
of the cases have involved faculty being discriminated against for engaging in 
research that an administration disagrees with or dislikes.  Instead, these cases 
often involve professors being denied certain perquisites or job opportunities 
such as the ability to apply for certain grants,118 access to laboratory space,119 
travel to countries designated as terrorist states to conduct research,120 or the 
ability to be on a particular research grant project.121  Other cases involve clear 
misconduct not related to First Amendment activities.122 
The most prominent campus speech case involving academic research is 
Urofsky v. Gilmore.123  In that case, the en banc Fourth Circuit rejected the 
argument that a Virginia law restricting state employees (including professors) 
from accessing sexually explicit material with state-owned computers violated 
the First Amendment.124  The reasoning of Urofsky is disturbing because the 
Fourth Circuit essentially rejected any special First Amendment protection for 
professors, concluding that “[t]he Supreme Court, to the extent it has 
constitutionalized a right of academic freedom at all, appears to have recognized 
only an institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs.”125  Even 
worse, the Fourth Circuit effectively rejected the claim “that professors possess 
a First Amendment right of academic freedom to determine for themselves the 
 
 117. Lawrence White, Fifty Years of Academic Freedom Jurisprudence, 36 J. COLL. & U.L. 
791, 832 (2010). 
 118. See, e.g., Martinez v. Univ. of P.R., Civil No. 06-1713 (JAF), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
92925, at *3, 11 (D.P.R. Dec. 22, 2006) (emphasizing that the university had taken action based on 
“the mere idea or proposal to write a book, and not to any actual, created speech”). 
 119. See, e.g., Naftchi v. N.Y. Univ., 14 F. Supp. 2d 473, 481–82, 492–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 120. See, e.g., Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1207 (S.D. 
Fla. 2007) (“The Act does not prohibit scholarship about the designated countries, or discussion (in 
or outside of the classroom) about those countries, their governments, policies, etc.  Nor does it 
prohibit students, faculty members, or researchers from traveling to the countries, or punish them 
in any way for engaging in such travel.  The Act simply establishes that Florida, as a state, will not 
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 121. See, e.g., Radolf v. Univ. of Conn., 364 F. Supp. 2d 204, 215 (D. Conn. 2005) (“It is 
important at the outset to emphasize precisely what Dr. Radolf claims was a violation of his First 
Amendment right to academic freedom.  He does not assert that Defendants prevented him from 
teaching or performing research on any subject matter.  Nor does he claim in Count 2 that 
Defendants retaliated against him for engaging in protected First Amendment activities, by, for 
example, denying him the opportunity to participate in a grant available to others because of his 
speech on matters of public concern.”). 
 122. See, e.g., San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1135 n.14 (3d Cir. 1992) (“He was 
not dismissed, nor does he allege that he was dismissed, for any reason relating to anything that 
could be considered a free expression issue.”). 
 123. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 124. Id. at 404. 
 125. Id. at 412. 
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content of their courses and scholarship.”126  This decision has properly been 
described as the “nadir” of court protection for individual academic freedom.127  
But for purposes of this article, it is significant that Urofsky is not an example of 
discrimination based on the content of academic research.  Instead, Urofsky 
concerned the ability of a professor to carry out his research using state funded 
resources.  Thus, Urofsky cannot be read as supportive of the ability of an 
academic institution to penalize a professor for the subject matter of his 
academic research.  Urofsky also seems to have been tacitly overturned, or at the 
very least seriously undermined.128 
One other case comes a bit closer to suggesting that a university can take 
action based on the content of academic research, but still does not involve any 
kind of viewpoint-based discrimination.  A professor at the University of Illinois 
was denied tenure and terminated purportedly because “his area of research 
overlapped that of an already tenured professor.”129  The Seventh Circuit 
rejected this argument as “patently frivolous.”130  It emphasized that 
“[a]cademic freedom does not empower a professor to dictate to the University 
what research will be done using the school’s facilities or how many faculty 
positions will be devoted to a particular area.”131  The Court’s curt dismissal of 
this claim is likely attributable to the fact that the claim was raised for the first 
time on appeal, and it also does not appear that there was any evidence of 
discrimination based on viewpoint.132 
On the other hand, faculty freedom to engage in research has been upheld in 
two cases involving an attempt to subpoena research, rather than disputes within 
the academy.133  Although these cases are not directly on point, they indicate the 
significance of the relationship between academic research and a professor’s 
ability to access academic freedom.  The Seventh Circuit recognized that such 
subpoenas would be “capable of chilling the exercise of academic freedom” 
 
 126. Id. at 414. 
 127. White, supra note 117, at 832–33.  Urofsky has been the subject of a particularly robust 
critique over the years.  See e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom in Scholarship 
and in Court, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 5, 2001) (“Because the [en banc Urofsky] court relied 
in no small part on a scholarly article by me to support its conclusion, I feel a duty to express my 
professional view that the opinion is profoundly wrong as a matter of law, and threatens the freedom 
of higher education.”); Michael D. Hancock, Note, Why Urofsky v. Gilmore Still Fails to Satisfy, 
RICHMOND J.L. & TECH. (Winter 1999–2000), http://jolt.richmond.edu/jolt-
archive/v6i3/note2.html; Steven G. Olswang, The Demise of Academic Freedom: Urofsky v. 
Gilmore, 22nd Annual Law & Higher Education Conference, STETSON U. COLL. L., (Feb. 18–20, 
2001), https://www.stetson.edu/law/conferences/highered/archive/2001/The_Demise_of_
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 128. See infra note 179 and accompanying text. 
 129. McElearney v. Univ. of Ill., 612 F.2d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 130. Id. at 288. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1265–66 (7th Cir. 1982); Cusumano v. 
Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 710 (1st Cir. 1998); see also White, supra note 117, at 831–32. 
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because the danger of research being inappropriately expropriated and 
scrutinized would “tend to check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars, qualities 
at once so fragile and so indispensable for fruitful academic labor.”134  These 
cases therefore set an important baseline for the importance of academic 
freedom in research endeavors.  Academic speech must be protected because 
otherwise scholars will be inhibited in their willingness to pursue knowledge 
that is innovative, cutting-edge, or controversial. 
In the absence of cases directly on point, it is difficult to say what courts will 
do if faced with an example of a professor who is being excluded or rewarded 
for the viewpoint expressed in her research.  Scholarship on this point, however, 
tends to favor robust protection for academic research, even when the author 
may be supportive of greater restrictions on classroom speech.135  There is 
something uniquely personal about academic research, which suggests that 
university efforts to trample on this kind of academic freedom should be met 
with especially rigorous scrutiny. 
3.  Extramural Speech 
Extramural speech is a broad category of speech that can encompass anything 
a professor says and does outside of teaching and research.  Extramural speech 
is generally recognized as one of the key aspects of religious freedom, even 
though it may be “the most mysterious and the most elusive of the three.”136  
Scholars debate whether extramural speech is in fact academic speech at all.137  
This debate is largely theoretical in nature, however, since in practice extramural 
speech is the most fully and consistently protected kind of professorial speech. 
For instance, an Eastern Michigan University professor was allowed to 
challenge his suspension for racially tinged tweets critical of the university’s 
 
 134. Dow Chem. Co., 672 F.2d at 1276 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 
262 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 135. See, e.g., Yudof, supra note 69, at 842 (“First, there must be unbridled freedom to do 
research, while the constraints in the classroom are more severe.  Research outside of the classroom 
may be thought to be more analogous to the speaker in the park than to the hired speaker in the post 
office or university building.”). 
 136. Bérubé, supra note 101.  Michael Bérubé intriguingly analogized extramural speech to 
the “Holy Spirit of the Christian Trinity.”  Id. 
 137. Matthew W. Finkin and Robert C. Post have called extramural speech “[t]he most 
theoretically problematic aspect of academic freedom” since it does not concern the development 
of specialized academic knowledge.  MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON 
GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 127 (2009).  See also infra note 335 for 
further discussion of Finkin and Post.  Professor Keith E. Whittington has recently written a 
thoughtful account of extramural speech and how its protection serves as a “prophylactic rule” that 
protects efforts to disseminate knowledge outside of the scholarly community.  Keith E. 
Whittington, Academic Freedom and the Scope of Protections for Extramural Speech, ACADEME 
(Winter 2019), https://www.aaup.org/article/academic-freedom-and-scope-protections-
extramural-speech#.YDLEMjKSlyy.  Whittington’s highly persuasive account shows why the 
protection of extramural speech is vital to both free speech and academic freedom. 
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response to an incident of racially motivated graffiti on the university campus.138  
The court first concluded that the professor spoke as a private citizen because 
“[u]sing a public forum to comment on the University’s response to recent racial 
incidents would not appear to be within a history professor’s official duties.”139  
Significantly, the court rejected the university’s claim that the speech in question 
would cause disharmony between the professor, his colleagues, and the 
students.140  The court emphasized that “[i]n the academic setting ‘dissent is 
expected’ and, accordingly, so is at least some disharmony.”141 
Similarly, the Second Circuit found that a university erred when it penalized 
a professor for his controversial racial views that were expressed solely outside 
of the classroom.142  The university created alternative class sections for all 
students that felt offended by the professor’s views and threatened to take further 
disciplinary action against the professor.143  Both the Southern District of New 
York and the Second Circuit critiqued the administration for not taking further 
action to prevent disruption of the professor’s class.144  The District Court noted 
that the university’s claim “that exposure in the campus environment to [the] 
Professor[’s] views might somehow have caused some students harm . . . could 
have constitutionally been accorded no weight” because a university “may not 
hinder the exercise of first amendment rights simply because it feels that 
exposure to a given group’s ideas may be somehow harmful to certain 
students.”145 
In summary, looking at the vast run of professorial speech cases in the lower 
courts, courts tend to be highly deferential to academic institutions.  But there is 
a consistent thread that when professors are punished because of disagreement 
based on the viewpoint of the speech, courts are much more likely to intervene 
and to scrutinize university action closely and carefully.  Courts are also much 
more likely to scrutinize university action when it concerns speech that is 
removed from the classroom and involves the professor’s own personal thoughts 
on topics of public concern. 
 
 138. Initially, the plaintiff filed with his union and an arbiter reversed the suspension.  
However, the court in this case ruled on a motion to dismiss based on a claim of qualified immunity 
and said that the university may prevail on summary judgment after more discovery.  Final 
judgment was never issued and the case was dismissed at the request of the parties after the first 
motion.  Higbee v. E. Mich. Univ., 399 F. Supp. 3d 694, 697, 700 (E.D. Mich. 2019), case 
dismissed, No. 19-1751, 2019 WL 5079254 (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 2019). 
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D.  Garcetti 
Pickering and its progeny left public employee speech rights in a somewhat 
precarious position.  But, as previously discussed, professors could still prevail 
under Pickering, especially when viewpoint discrimination was involved or 
when the restrictions concerned extramural speech.  However, the Supreme 
Court’s 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos put continued protection for 
professorial speech rights in great jeopardy.146 
In Garcetti, a district attorney wrote a memo criticizing his office’s handling 
of a case and urging its dismissal.147  The defense called the attorney and testified 
regarding his concerns.148  His employer then retaliated against him.149  The 
Ninth Circuit had found that the attorney’s speech was protected under the 
Pickering test.150  The Supreme Court reversed.151  In doing so, the Supreme 
Court imposed two significant limitations on Pickering’s employee speech 
protections.  The first is that an employer is entitled to take action against speech 
that merely “has some potential to affect the entity’s operations.”152  The second, 
even more dramatic change, was that “when public employees make statements 
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for 
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”153  Restrictions on such speech 
“does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private 
citizen.”154  Instead, it “reflects the exercise of employer control over what the 
employer itself has commissioned or created.”155 
The potential implications for academic freedom are enormous.  Much of what 
a professor does, such as teaching, writing, publishing, and presenting at 
symposia, could be described as “pursuant to their official duties.”156  If 
Garcetti’s logic were strictly applied to professors, then it could eviscerate any 
protection they had at all.  Justice Souter, in his pointed dissent, noted that 
teachers “necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant to . . . official duties’” and, 
therefore, the majority opinion could have grave consequences for the protection 
of academic freedom.157  In response, the majority opinion recognized that 
“[t]here is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or 
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are not 
 
 146. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 147. Id. at 414. 
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538 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 70:515 
fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech 
jurisprudence.”158  But rather than resolve the issue, the Court punted, declaring 
that it “need not . . . decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply 
in the same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or 
teaching.”159 
Scholars have largely shared Justice Souter’s concern, arguing that professors 
are employed to engage in a career of open inquiry and that this vocation makes 
Garcetti inapplicable to them.160  On the other hand, some scholars have 
defended Garcetti, arguing that Garcetti properly protects the right of academic 
institutions to weigh the quality and relevance of academic speech.161 
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E.  The Circuit Split over Garcetti 
Courts following Garcetti have been largely split as to whether Garcetti 
applies in the academic setting. 
1.  Courts Applying Garcetti 
The Seventh Circuit has applied Garcetti and, in Renken v. Gregory, ruled that 
a professor who criticized how his university administered grant funds was not 
protected because he had been a grant recipient as part of his “teaching and 
service responsibilities.”162  Similarly, in an earlier case, the Seventh Circuit 
held that an elementary school teacher could be fired for telling students about 
how she had honked her car in solidarity with protests against the Iraq war.163  
The court emphasized that a teacher is hired for her speech and that “[e]xpression 
is a teacher’s stock in trade, the commodity she sells to her employer in exchange 
for a salary.”164  Accordingly, this was “an easier case for the employer than 
Garcetti.”165  However, the court appeared to reserve the question of “[h]ow 
much room is left for constitutional protection of scholarly viewpoints in post-
secondary education.”166  But post-Renken in the states within the Seventh 
Circuit, a professor’s in-class speech would likely be entitled to no First 
Amendment protection at all, and most other forms of academically related 
speech would be on extremely thin ice. 
Other than the Seventh Circuit, most of the other courts embracing Garcetti 
have done so rather tepidly and tentatively, or without any analysis at all.167  In 
a non-precedential decision, the Fifth Circuit applied Garcetti to the speech of a 
professor who was seeking a prestigious professorship and a deanship.168  The 
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professor was excluded from the search because he opposed the tenure system 
and, accordingly, had not taken tenure himself and had spoken out against 
tenure.169  The court found that “his tenure status is a condition of employment 
that is inextricably entwined with his role as an employee” and that, accordingly, 
“[h]e is no more protected from adverse action for his tenure status than a 
plaintiff would be for refusing to attend training or complete peer 
evaluations.”170  Because the professor’s speech had arisen in the context of the 
hiring search, he “was not speaking as a private citizen on a matter of public 
concern.”171  The court then emphasized that Garcetti was the proper standard 
for speech relating to a job interview because “[i]nterviews necessarily involve 
discussions that touch on matters that—when addressed in the public sphere—
might count as issues of public concern,” and an employer must be free to ask 
about such thing as “leadership philosophy” in order “to gauge whether the 
applicant will be an effective employee.”172  An employer must be free to 
“screen applicants to ensure that they actually will perform their duties with 
maximal diligence.”173  In a footnote, however, the Fifth Circuit qualified its 
opinion by noting that “[w]e need not answer today whether and to what degree 
the questioning must be related to the position that the applicant is seeking.”174 
2.  Courts Refusing to Apply Garcetti 
In sharp contrast to the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit sharply rejected the 
application of Garcetti to state-employed teachers.  In Demers v. Austin, the 
court considered the case of a tenured college professor who was punished for 
critiquing the nature of social science research in the academy.175  The Ninth 
Circuit explained that this was “the kind of case that worried Justice Souter” 
since “teaching and academic writing are at the core of the official duties of 
teachers and professors.”176  Because such speech is “‘a special concern of the 
First Amendment’ . . . Garcetti would directly conflict with the important First 
Amendment values previously articulated by the Supreme Court.”177  
Accordingly, the court would continue to apply the Pickering test rather than 
Garcetti to “teaching and academic writing.”178 
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The Fourth Circuit similarly rejected the application of Garcetti.179  It 
acknowledged that “[t]here may be instances in which a public university faculty 
member’s assigned duties include a specific role in declaring or administering 
university policy, as opposed to scholarship or teaching.”180  In such 
circumstances, Garcetti might apply.  But “[a]pplying Garcetti to the academic 
work of a public university faculty member . . . could place beyond the reach of 
First Amendment protection many forms of public speech or service a professor 
engaged in during his employment.”181  In other words, general First 
Amendment principles would apply unless a professor’s speech was “tied to any 
more specific or direct employee duty than the general concept that professors 
will engage in writing, public appearances, and service within their respective 
fields.”182 
Most recently, the Sixth Circuit issued a significant decision rejecting Garcetti 
in the context of a professor’s in-class speech.183  Nicholas Meriwether is a 
philosophy professor at Shawnee State University.184  Because of his deeply-
held religious beliefs he objected to a requirement that all professors refer to 
students by the students’ preferred gender pronouns.185  The university 
repeatedly rejected Merriweather’s requests for various accommodations or 
compromises, such as the option of complying with the policy but putting a 
disclaimer in the class syllabus that he was doing so under compulsion.186  The 
university investigated and found that Merriweather’s treatment of transgender 
students was discriminatory and placed a formal warning in his personnel file.187  
The Court found that Garcetti did not apply to a professor “at least when 
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engaged in core academic functions, such as teaching and scholarship.”188  In 
light of the Supreme Court’s declaration of the “essentiality of freedom in the 
community of American universities,”189 it would be “alarming” if professors 
lacked free-speech protections when teaching.190   A few additional circuits 
also appear to have rejected the application of Garcetti, but without much 
analysis as to why.191 
3.  A Note of Concern from the Supreme Court 
Recently, four members of the Supreme Court expressed their concern with 
how some courts have expansively applied the Garcetti test.  In Kennedy v. 
Bremerton School District, a football coach had been fired for praying on the 
football field before games.192  The Ninth Circuit applied Garcetti and affirmed 
the dismissal.193  Justices Alito, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh all concurred 
in the denial of certiorari, but voiced their concern with the Ninth Circuit 
decision below.  They accused the Ninth Circuit of “appear[ing] to regard 
teachers and coaches as being on duty at all times from the moment they report 
for work to the moment they depart, provided that they are within the eyesight 
of students.”194  But “[t]his Court certainly has never read Garcetti to go that 
far.”195  Although this case is not about Garcetti’s application to higher 
education, it does suggest that the Court’s more conservative members may have 
grown uncomfortable with an expansive reading of Garcetti.  If so, this would 
be a significant development since Justice Breyer, who dissented in Garcetti, 
remains on the Court, while the original author of Garcetti, Justice Kennedy, has 
retired. 
4.  A Brief Recap 
Just as the Supreme Court has not resolved or squarely addressed the 
centralized tension between individual and institutional speech rights, it has 
 
 188. Id. at 505. 
 189. Id. at 504 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)). 
 190. Id. at 506. 
 191. See McCullough v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 559 F.3d 855, 865 (8th Cir. 2009); 
Buchanan v. Alexander, 919 F.3d 847, 853 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 
800, 810 (6th Cir. 2001)), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 432 (2019).  The Second Circuit has gone in a 
somewhat different direction.  It has not yet resolved whether Garcetti applies to teachers or 
professors, but it has “held that school administrators may limit the content of school-sponsored 
speech so long as the limitations are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  Lee-
Walker v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 3d 484, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Panse v. 
Eastwood, 303 F. App’x 933, 934–35 (2d Cir. 2008)), aff’d, 712 F. App’x 43 (2d Cir. 2017).  This 
intermediate standard would allow for some limited First Amendment protection of academic 
speech but would largely defer to the institution. 
 192. Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 635 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 193. Id. at 636. 
 194. Id. at 636. 
 195. Id. 
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similarly not addressed the lingering division over the application of Garcetti.  
In some circuits, a professor has little to no protection, while in other circuits, 
the Pickering test applies with some force.  In either event, courts are prone to 
defer to academic institutions in their academic judgments and evaluations.  But 
that deference may be more limited when dealing with extramural speech or 
when viewpoint discrimination can be detected.  With this legal background 
established, it is time to take a close look at mandatory diversity statements and 
consider how changes to the nature of higher education could or should alter the 
legal landscape. 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIVERSITY STATEMENT 
Requiring faculty applicants to complete a diversity statement is a recent trend 
in higher education that has been employed most aggressively by the UC system.  
But UC is far from the only university to encourage or require faculty members 
or applicants to write about diversity issues.196  For instance, at Virginia Tech, a 
professor is encouraged to reference “active involvement in diversity and 
inclusion” as part of her personal statement, and also to include a “list of 
activities that promote or contribute to inclusive teaching, research, outreach, 
and service.”197  In 2017, the Oregon Association of Scholars estimated that 
twenty major universities or university systems in the U.S. made use of 
mandatory diversity statements.198  This number has likely grown since then.  
This article, nevertheless, focuses on the UC system because it has been on the 
forefront of the growth of the diversity statement, and holds itself out as a model 
for others to emulate.199  It is likely that whatever trends have developed in the 
UC system will sooner or later spread elsewhere, especially if UC does not face 
significant legal or political pushback.200 
 
 196. See Goldberg, supra note 11, at 650–51. 
 197. Office of the Exec. Vice President and Provost, Virginia Tech Guidelines for Promotion 




 198. The Imposition of Diversity Statements on Faculty Hiring and Promotion at Oregon 
Universities, OR. ASS’N OF SCHOLARS 4 (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.oregonscholars.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/DiversityStatements_Rev16Mar17.pdf. 
 199. The UC system describes its policy as “a national model for universities to recognize and 
credit contributions to equal opportunity and diversity when evaluating faculty achievement for 
appointment, advancement, and promotion.”  Letter from Aimée Dorr, Provost and Exec. Vice 
President Acad. Affs. to Chancellors, UC OFF. OF THE PROVOST & EXEC. VICE PRESIDENT FOR 
ACAD. AFFS. (June 29, 2015), https://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel-programs/_files/apm/
apm-210-1-d-issuance/apm-210-1-d-issuance-ltr.pdf. 
 200. BENJAMIN GINSBERG, THE FALL OF THE FACULTY 113 (2011) (noting that universities 
are prone to copy diversity programs and policies set by peer institutions). 
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Consideration of a “contribution[ ] to diversity” at UC began very modestly 
and rather unobjectionably.201  In 2005, the Academic Personnel Manual (APM) 
was revised to include several references to contributions to diversity in the 
Appointment and Promotion section.  The stated goal of these changes was to 
ensure that “[t]eaching, research, professional and public service contributions 
that promote diversity and equal opportunity are to be encouraged and given 
recognition in the evaluation of the candidate’s qualifications.”202  Already at 
that time, there were some signs of concern that previewed the subsequent role 
these statements would come to play.  For instance, the policy suggested that 
credit should be given for “research in a scholar’s area of expertise that 
highlights inequalities,” which suggests that certain kinds of research would be 
viewed more favorably than others in the hiring process.203 
Nevertheless, the policy as written is mostly innocuous.  Professors who 
engage in activities such as mentoring underprivileged students may expend 
significant energy that is not reflected in traditional scholarly output.  It is 
difficult to see anything wrong or sinister with taking these kinds of 
contributions to the university community into account.  In 2015204, the policy 
was expanded modestly to emphasize that contributions to diversity “should be 
evaluated and credited in the same way as other faculty achievements,” but the 
role that contributions to diversity plays remained largely unchanged.205  The 
APM is a document that emerges only through extensive university-wide 
discussion, which includes faculty senate deliberations.206  It is, therefore, the 
document that best captures what policies maintain a robust consensus among 
all the UC schools, and what is absent from the APM is, therefore, especially 
striking. 
The systemwide consensus, as recently as 2015, rested on two foundational 
pillars: 
 
 201. Academic Personnel Manual, Appointment and Promotion (APM-210), UC 4 (Feb. 1, 
1994), https://web.archive.org/web/20140809092341/http://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel-
programs/_files/apm/apm-210.pdf. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Academic Personnel Policy Issuance (APM-210-1-d), UC SANTA BARBARA 4 (July 
1, 2015), https://ap.ucsb.edu/news.and.announcements/memos/?7.1.2015.Revised.APM.210.1.d;.
Review.and.Appraisal.Committees. 
 205. Academic Personnel Manual, Appointment and Promotion (APM-210), UC 4 (Feb. 1, 
1994), https://web.archive.org/web/20140809092341/http://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel-
programs/_files/apm/apm-210.pdf.  This relatively modest change engendered extensive 
disagreements among the various faculty committees that considered changes, which underscores 
that this topic remains controversial among faculty members.  See Letter from Aimée Dorr, supra 
note 199; Office of the President, Chronology of the Consultation Process for APM-210-1-d 
Effective July 1, 2015, UC (June 29, 2015), https://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel-
programs/_files/apm/apm-210-1-d-issuance/apm-210-1-d-iss-ltr-appdx.pdf. 
 206. Office of Acad. Pers., Academic Personnel Manual (APM) Policy Development Process 
Guide, UC 1–3, https://www.ucop.edu/academic-personnel-programs/_files/policy-development-
process/policy-development-process-guide.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2021). 
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[F]irst, that faculty efforts in promoting equal opportunity and 
diversity should be evaluated and credited on the same basis as other 
contributions, but should not be understood as constituting a “fourth 
leg” of evaluation, along with research and creative activity, teaching, 
and service; and second, that these contributions should not receive 
more credit than other contributions simply on the basis of their 
subject matter.207 
Consideration of a contribution to diversity is not intended to give a leg up 
“simply on the basis of their subject matter.”208  There is no mandate that every 
applicant fill out a separate diversity statement and no suggestion that a 
candidate without contributions to diversity should be rejected out of hand.  
Instead, as originally envisioned and currently enshrined in a system-wide 
policy, contributions to diversity were intended to be seen as a plus-factor and 
not a separate and discreet hiring requirement. 
Almost immediately various campuses of the UC system began to interpret 
this policy in dramatically different ways.  Over the past few years, almost all of 
the UC schools have adopted a requirement that all faculty applicants file a 
separate standalone diversity statement.209  UC Santa Barbara had long been a 
holdout against the trend towards requiring these separate statements,210 but 
 
 207. Letter from Mary Gilly, Chair of the Assembly of the Acad. Senate, UC, to Susan Carlson, 
Vice Provost for Acad. Pers. and Programs, in Chronology of the Consultation Process for APM-
210-1-d. 
 208. Id. 
 209. There is some uncertainty as to what exactly the policy is at UC Berkeley at the moment.  
Berkeley’s Senate Search Guide at one point stated that “[a]ll applications require a Curriculum 
Vitae and a statement on diversity, equity, and inclusion.”  This was pointed out to UC Berkeley 
administrators in January 2020.  Conversation with Dan Mogulof, Assistant Vice Chancellor for 
Exec. Commc’ns, U.C. (Jan. 29, 2020) (on file with author).  Thereafter, the language was updated 
to read: “The default assumption in AP Recruit (with standard auto-populated language) is to 
require a statement on diversity, equity, inclusion, and belonging (DEIB) as part of the initial 
application.  Given the requirement to assess DEIB as part of the evaluation process, the majority 
of committees choose to ask for such a statement up front.”  However, a department could also 
choose to ask for the statement from a more limited portion of the applicant pool (e.g., candidates 
under serious consideration).  Office for Faculty Equity and Welfare, Senate Search Guide, UC 
BERKELEY, https://ofew.berkeley.edu/senate-search-guide (last visited Mar. 10, 2021).  So, 
diversity statements are technically not required at UC Berkeley but are expected unless a search 
committee affirmatively decides not to require them. 
 210. As recently as September 2020, the UC Santa Barbara “Red Binder” stated that “[t]here 
is no presumption that all faculty will engage with this opportunity, nor are diversity statements 
required . . . .  As with the teaching self-assessment, the diversity statement is an opportunity to 
provide context and evidence of impact or effectiveness towards a fuller understanding of those 
contributions.”  Red Binder § I-75: Appointment and Advancement, UC SANTA BARBARA 11 (Sept. 
2020), 
https://ap.ucsb.edu/policies.and.procedures/red.binder/sections/%5B1_75%5D%20Appointment
%20and%20Advancement.pdf.  The UC Santa Barbara Committee on Academic Personnel has also 
declared that it “is opposed to requiring statements for merit cases.”  Comm. on Acad. Pers., 
Videoconference Minutes, UC ACAD. SENATE 3 (May 8, 2019), https://senate.
universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/committees/ucap/ucap-5-8-2019-minutes.pdf. 
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appears to have finally relented.211  Similarly, some schools, such as UCLA, 
have already begun mandating consideration of contributions to diversity in 
tenure and advancement decisions.212 
In the past few years, there has been a push by system-wide diversity officers 
to force all campuses in the UC system to more aggressively adopt these 
diversity statements.  In November 2018, the UC Systemwide Equal 
Opportunity/Affirmative Action Administrators Group developed a statement 
jointly with the statewide faculty Senate Committee on Affirmative Action, 
Diversity and Equity (UCAADE) entitled “Recommendations for The Use of 
Contributions to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) Statements for 
Academic Positions at the University of California.”213  This document was 
approved by the Academic Council on January 23, 2019.214  It made a series of 
six recommendations: 
Require all faculty applicants at the University of California to submit 
a DEI statement. 
Provide guidance to potential candidates on how to prepare DEI 
statements. 
Create an assessment rubric, in consultation with the Equity Advisor 
or equivalent, to evaluate the candidate’s ability. 
Further assess candidates’ readiness to advance diversity, equity, and 
inclusions during the campus visit. 
Ensure department-level accountability. 
Each campus should develop guidelines to implement the use of DEI 
statements in a consistent manner to align expectations regarding 
assessment of diversity contributions from time of hiring through 
academic reviews for merit and promotion.215 
There are a couple of elements in these recommendations that are noteworthy 
and troubling.  With regard to the development of an assessment rubric, 
candidates would be required to “[a]rticulate awareness and understanding of 
 
 211. See Diversity Statement Guidelines, UC SANTA BARBARA, THE GEVIRTZ SCHOOL, 
https://education.ucsb.edu/diversity-statement-guidelines (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (“A Diversity 
Statement is required as one component of a complete application, and will be reviewed by the 
search committee along with your other materials.”). 
 212. Memorandum from Scott L. Waugh, Exec. Vice Chancellor & Provost, to Deans, the 
University Librarian, Department Chairs, and Equity Advisors, UCLA (May 24, 2018), 
https://equity.ucla.edu/news-and-events/new-edi-statement-requirement-for-regular-rank-faculty-
searches/.  However, based on a private conversation with a faculty member at UCLA, who recently 
went through the advancement process, but wishes to remain anonymous, it appears that diversity 
statements are not being required with any real rigor in this process. 
 213. Letter from Robert C. May, Chair of Academic Council, U.C. to Michael Brown, Provost, 
and Academic Senate Division Chairs, UC, 1 (Feb. 25, 2019), https://senate.universityofcalifornia.
edu/_files/reports/rm-mb-divchairs-use-of-dei-statements.pdf. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 3–4. 
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diversity, equity, and inclusion, especially as they related to underrepresented 
groups in higher education.”216  In addition, these recommendations expressly 
state that “[l]ife experiences may be an important aspect” of the evaluation of 
contributions to diversity, which, as will later be discussed, opens up the door 
for consideration of an applicant’s own race or gender.217  This document also 
recommends a separate “written assessment of the proposed faculty hire’s 
awareness, record, and future plans to advance diversity, equity, and 
inclusion.”218  In other words, if these policies were adopted, all UC schools 
would move much closer to treating a diversity statement as an independent 
“fourth leg” of evaluation.219  Finally, and most controversially, this document 
would require that all current faculty be evaluated for contributions to diversity, 
preferable “through a DEI statement that foregrounds and makes explicit DEI 
contributions to research, teaching, and/or service.”220  In light of that 
recommendation, the assurances that “DEI statements do not represent a new 
criterion for evaluation” do not seem particularly reassuring.221 
This final recommendation also appears to have been adopted without full 
consultation with the University Committee on Academic Personnel, which thus 
far has not embraced the requirement that current faculty be evaluated for 
contributions to diversity.222  According to the Academic Council, 
“contributions to diversity are not mandatory” and “individuals lacking a 
diversity profile will not be held back.”223  The battle between diversity officers 
and the faculty will likely continue over the next few years, which may limit 
how quickly these changes are adopted.224 
 
 216. Id. at 3. 
 217. Id.; see infra Section II.A.1. 
 218. UCAADE & EO/AA, supra note 213, at 4. 
 219. See Acad. Council, Minutes of Meeting, UC ACAD. SENATE 7 (July 25, 2018), 
https://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/committees/council/council-7-25-18-minutes.pdf 
(recommending reopening debate on whether to add diversity as a “fourth criterion for promotion 
and tenure”).  But cf. Letter from Mary Gilly, supra note 207 (noting that efforts to promote 
diversity should “not be understood as constituting a ‘fourth leg’ of evaluation”). 
 220. UCAADE & EO/AA, supra note 213, at 4. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Acad. Council, Minutes of Meeting, UC ACAD. SENATE 2 (Jan. 23, 2019), 
https://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/committees/council/council-1-23-19-minutes.pdf 
(“UCAADE Chair Siu noted that UCAADE revised recommendation 6 to clarify that academic 
reviews will not require DEI statements.  Supporting language was also added to clarify that 
recommendation 6 is consistent with existing language in APM 210-1-d; that exceptional 
contributions to DEI may warrant additional recognition as aspects of research, teaching, and/or 
service, but that DEI statements do not represent a fourth criterion for evaluation; and that campuses 
may determine the best format for the submission of statements.”). 
 223. Id.  (“The intent of the recommendations is to raise awareness, and to regularize and 
highlight existing APM language, which is clear that contributions to diversity are not mandatory, 
but can help enhance and boost a file; individuals lacking a diversity profile will not be held back.”). 
 224. Mona Lynch, UCAADE Chair, recently urged the Faculty Senate to “to take diversity 
contributions seriously in promotion and tenure reviews, and apply consistent use of the 
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But those advocating for an increased role for diversity statements at UC 
Schools have found another, even more effective mechanism to rapidly 
accelerate their use.  Since 2015, the California legislature has been offering 
grant funding for programs aimed at increasing faculty diversity.225  
Accordingly, the Office of the President (UCOP) has been issuing RFPs 
(Requests for Proposals) for Advancing Faculty Diversity Recruitment.226  
These programs come from the individual campuses “through each campus’ 
Office of the Provost/Executive Vice Chancellor,” and, therefore, bypass the 
need to get the faculty senate on board with a policy.227  Campuses are 
encouraged to develop increasingly radical diversity programs in order to qualify 
for up to a half million dollars of funding per proposal.228  The pilot programs 
that have received this funding have focused on a variety of approaches, some 
of which are unobjectionable, such as extending additional mentoring to 
minority faculty hires.229  But several schools—including UC Davis, UC Santa 
Cruz, UC Berkeley, and UC Riverside—have focused on an expanded use of 
mandatory diversity statements as a central part of their pilot programs.230  These 
pilot programs have thus far featured several innovations. 
First, diversity statements are treated as a threshold requirement for 
consideration.  If an applicant’s statement falls short, then the applicant will no 
longer be considered.  At UC Davis, for instance, those evaluating candidates 
were told that, “[n]o one crosses into threshold unless they look outstanding with 
 
statements.”  Acad. Council, Minutes of Meeting, UC ACAD. SENATE 6 (Sept. 25, 2019), 
https://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/committees/council/council-9-25-19-minutes.pdf. 
 225. Letter from Susan L. Carlson, Acting Provost, Exec. Vice President Acad. Affairs, to 
Exec. Vice Chancellors/Provosts, UC at 2 (June 7, 2019), https://www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/_
files/advancing-faculty-diversity-rfp/afd-recruitment-rfp.pdf. 
 226. Id. at 2. 
 227. Id. at 3. 
 228. Id. at 2. 
 229. UCOP is required to issue an annual legislative report, which provides critical insights 
into the programs that have been approved and their outcomes.  UC OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
FINAL REPORT ON THE 2016–2017 USE OF ONE-TIME FUNDS TO SUPPORT BEST PRACTICES IN 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN FACULTY EMPLOYMENT 5 (Nov. 2017), 
https://www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/_files/reports/adv-fac-div-2016-17-final-leg-report.pdf. 
 230. This is the list of searches that have used or are currently using this methodology: 
UC Berkeley - Engineering 2017-2018; Life Sciences 2018-2019: 
UC Davis - Eight open discipline hires (one in each college/school) 2018-2019; School of Medicine 
2019-2020 or 2020-2021; The College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences 2019-2020 or 
2020-2021; The College of Engineering 2019-2020 or 2020-2021. 
UC Riverside - Mathematics 2018-2019; Engineering 2018-2019; Physical Sciences 2019-2020 or 
2020-2021. 
UC San Francisco- Biomedical Sciences 2017-2018. 
UC Santa Cruz- Arts 2019-2020 or 2020-2021; Engineering 2019-2020 or 2020-2021; Global and 
Community Health Program in the divisions of Physical and Biological Sciences and Social 
Sciences 2019-2020 or 2020-2021. 
UC San Diego- Division of Physical Science (including Departments of Mathematics, Chemistry, 
and Physics) 2017-2020. 
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regard to their contributions to diversity.”231  Moreover, evaluators were told to 
set a “high bar” and to eliminate any candidate that receives a low score on any 
of the elements of the diversity statement.232  Or as UC Davis put it in its outward 
promotional material for the program: “Only those candidates with a strong and 
compelling Statement of Contributions to Diversity will move forward in the 
evaluation process.”233 
Relatedly, diversity statements are now the first, and perhaps the only, thing 
that a reviewer will see.234  Thus, a reviewing panel will no longer have a holistic 
picture of the applicant when they evaluate the diversity statement.  This is a key 
feature of the search process rather than a bug.  The UC Davis Provost/Vice 
Chancellor Ralph Hexter spoke at a conference on faculty diversity in April 
2019, and explained that “[t]he game-changer is that, in these searches, it is the 
candidate’s diversity statement that is considered first; only those who submit 
persuasive and inspiring statements can advance for complete consideration.”235 
This is not a toothless requirement.  For instance, in a pilot program at UC 
Berkeley in Life Sciences, all but 214 of 893 qualified applicants were 
eliminated because their diversity statement did not meet the school’s “high 
standard.”236  In other words, seventy-six percent of qualified applicants were 
rejected without even considering their teaching skills, their publication history, 
their potential for academic excellence, or their ability to contribute to their field.  
As far as the university knew, these applicants could have well been the next 
Albert Einstein or Jonas Salk, or they might have been outstanding and 
innovative educators who would make a significant difference in students’ lives.  
At UC Davis, in some departments over fifty percent of the applicants were 
eliminated using this same methodology.237  In addition, the initial review of 
diversity statements is increasingly being shifted away from academic faculty 
members and towards administrators.238 
 
 231. Office of the Vice Provost – Academic Affairs, Orientation Presentation PowerPoint (Jan. 
2019) (attached as Appendix A). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Advancing Faculty Diversity Grant, 2018–2019, UC DAVIS, https://
academicaffairs.ucdavis.edu/advancing-faculty-diversity-pilot-project (last visited Dec. 5, 2020). 
 234. Orientation Presentation PowerPoint, supra note 231. 
 235. Conference Notes on file with author. 
 236. Rebecca Heald & Mary Wildermuth, Initiative to Advance Faculty Diversity, Equity and 
Inclusion in the Life Science at UC Berkeley Year End Summary Report: 2018–2019, UC 
BERKELEY, https://ofew.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/life_sciences_inititatve.year_end_report_
summary.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2021). 
 237. Letter from Ralph J. Hexter, Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor, to the U.C. Davis 
Academic Senate (Jan. 17, 2020), https://651d7eef-05d1-4785-8f04-93b49cc8d71f.filesusr.com/
ugd/257e28_99034734731c4b748f6c7df78005bb99.pdf. 
 238. For instance, seven of the UC campuses now have Equity Advisor programs, and six 
provide stipends to these advisors.  Acad. Council, Minutes of Meeting, UC ACAD. SENATE 2 (June 
26, 2019), https://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/committees/council/council-6-26-19-
minutes.pdf.  These advisors are “tenured faculty or senior staff members selected by a committee 
of faculty and administrators involved in diversity and equity issues.”  Id.  The Faculty Senate has 
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Some of these programs are also employing a very narrow definition of 
diversity.  For instance, the UC Davis pilot program focused solely on 
“commitment to the advancement of diversity, equity, and inclusion for 
underrepresented minority students and groups (African-American, Latino 
(a)/Chicano (a)/Hispanic, and Native American).”239  At UC Santa Cruz, 
applicants are evaluated on whether they “demonstrate an understanding of the 
barriers facing women and people of color” rather than any other types of 
diversity.240  In contrast, some other UC schools have continued to emphasize a 
broad and multifaceted definition of diversity.241 
Perhaps most troubling of all has been the development of particularly 
aggressive rubrics that expressly discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.  While 
originally diversity statements were seen as a plus factor in hiring or admission, 
the development of scoring rubrics at schools such as UC Davis, Berkeley, and 
Santa Cruz has pushed the evaluation of these statements in a different and much 
more radical direction.  These rubrics now include things an applicant could say 
that would result in a low or failing score.  For instance, a candidate who 
“[d]efines diversity only in terms of different areas of study or different 
nationalities, but doesn’t discuss gender or ethnicity/race” would get a low score, 
as would a candidate who “[m]ay discount the importance of diversity” or 
“[m]ay provide reasons for not considering diversity in hiring, or sees it as 
antithetical to academic freedom or the university’s research mission.”242 
Similarly, at UC Berkeley or UC Santa Cruz, a candidate who “may state that 
it’s better not to have outreach or affinity groups aimed at underrepresented 
individuals because it keeps them separate from everyone else, or will make 
them feel less valued” would get a low score on their awareness of diversity 
 
expressed concern that these equity advisors may come to be seen as “overseers” rather than 
advisors.  Id. 
 239. Open Rank Faculty Position in Public Health Sciences, UC DAVIS: RECRUIT, https://
recruit.ucdavis.edu/JPF03925 (last visited Feb. 16, 2021). 
 240. Physical and Biological Sciences: Biomedical Sciences—Assistant Professors, UC 
SANTA CRUZ: RECRUIT, https://recruit.ucsc.edu/JPF00756 (stating that “[i]nitial screening of 
candidates will be based on statements of contributions to diversity, equity, and inclusion”). 
 241. UC’s Regents Policy 4400 defines diversity broadly: “Diversity—a defining feature of 
California’s past, present, and future—refers to the variety of personal experiences, values, and 
worldviews that arise from differences of culture and circumstance.  Such differences include race, 
ethnicity, gender, age, religion, language, abilities/disabilities, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
socioeconomic status, and geographic region, and more.”  Bd. of Regents, Regents Policy 4400: 
Policy on University of California Diversity Statement, UC (Sept. 16, 2010), https://regents.
universityofcalifornia.edu/governance/policies/4400.html. 
 242. Rubric to Assess Candidate Contributions to Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion, UC 
BERKLEY [hereinafter Berkley Rubric], https://ofew.berkeley.edu/recruitment/contributions- 
diversity/rubric-assessing-candidate-contributions-diversity-equity. (last visited Mar. 10, 2021);  
Criteria for Scoring URM = African-Americans, Latin(x)/Hispanics, and Native Americas, UC 
IRVINE (on file with author).  
Fall 2021] In the Name of Diversity 551 
issues.243  Moreover, applicants are expected to not merely embrace generalized 
expectations such as treating all students equally or mentoring a diverse pool of 
students.  Achieving such generalized requirements would only earn an 
applicant a middling and likely failing score.244 
A faculty member’s research focus can also play an important role in the 
evaluation.  For instance, both UC Berkley and UC Santa Cruz would give a 
high score on work done to advance “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion” to faculty 
members who are “applying their research skills or expertise to investigating 
diversity, equity and inclusion.”245 
Emboldened by their success, UC campuses are dramatically expanding the 
use of the pilot methodology.  UC Santa Cruz recently announced that in 2019, 
one-third of faculty searches will be part of their pilot program where “search 
committees will first review and assess candidates’ statements on contributions 
to diversity, equity, and inclusion before determining whether to evaluate the 
rest of the application materials.”246  UC Davis is expanding this approach to 
“approved searches planned for the 2019–20 academic year.”247 
Many of these policies, such as the scoring of diversity statements prior to the 
rest of the application, are now being recommended as “new best practices for 
faculty searches.”248  Similarly, faculty members are encouraged to “require 
applicants to achieve a scoring cutoff to be considered.”249  It appears that the 
same rubrics developed for such pilot programs are being held out as a model to 
be used for all faculty applicants.250  It seems only a matter of time before the 
innovations in the use of diversity statements from these pilot programs is 
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UC (Dec. 2019), https://www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/_files/reports/adv-fac-div-2019-21-pre
lim-leg-report.pdf. 
 248. Email from Philip H. Kass, Vice Provost for Academic Affairs, UC Davis (on file with 
author); see also Letter from Ralph J. Hexter, Provost and Executive Vice Chancellor, to the Deans, 
UC DAVIS (June 13, 2019), https://651d7eef-05d1-4785-8f04-93b49cc8d71f.filesusr.com/ugd/
257e28_3839c3707ec242de8862478af8cb414b.pdf. 
 249. Letter from Ralph J. Hexter, supra note 248. 
 250. A report prepared for the Academic and Student Affairs Committee described UC 
Berkeley as piloting “new guidelines for using these statements to evaluate candidates at all levels 
of decision-making.”  Discussion Item from the Office of the President, to Members of the Acad. 
and Student Affairs Comm., Accountability Sub-Report on Diversity: Faculty Diversity Outcomes, 
UC 19 (Sept. 26, 2018), https://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/regmeet/sept18/a2.pdf. 
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imported in full into all faculty hiring decisions, and even to all retention, tenure, 
and advancement decisions. 
A.  Four Key Issues 
As described above, the development of mandatory diversity statements at UC 
raises at least four significant issues.  First, mandatory diversity statements can 
be used as a backdoor way to consider the race, gender, or other protected 
characteristics of applicants.  Second, mandatory diversity statements allow for 
viewpoint discrimination against a professor’s personal viewpoint.  Third, 
mandatory diversity statements allow for discrimination in favor of certain kinds 
of academic research at the exclusion of others.  Fourth, mandatory diversity 
statements require not merely agreement with the universities stated policies, but 
full-throated support. 
1.  Use of Race/Gender 
First, mandatory diversity statements may serve as a backdoor way for the 
consideration of race and gender in the hiring process.  This is a particularly 
salient issue in states like California or Michigan where the voters have enacted 
restrictions against affirmative action programs.  This issue is largely outside of 
the scope of this article, and so it will only be addressed briefly. 
In the face of the Supreme Court precedent banning race-based quotas, and 
the enactment of anti-affirmative action measures, such as California’s 
Proposition 209, administrative supporters of diversity initiatives have 
increasingly become more creative in their efforts to develop facially neutral 
programs that nevertheless achieve the goal of increasing diversity251  In 1996, 
California voters enacted Proposition 209, which banned the consideration of 
race and gender in higher education.252  Since then, administrators have sought 
 
 251. These programs proliferate even though internal data shows that UC is currently 
outshining most of its competitor institutions in diversity hiring by hiring well above national 
availabilities, and even though projections indicate that without any further interventions the 
percentage of minorities on the UC faculty “will likely match recent national availabilities as early 
as 2025.”  Id. at 12.  In fact, “compared to peer research institutions, UC places 3rd in terms of 
gender balance and 2nd in terms of URM faculty diversity.”  Shane White, Academic Senate Chair, 
Remarks to the University of California Board of Regents: Towards a More Diverse Faculty (May 
2018), https://senate.universityofcalifornia.edu/_files/resources/regents-remarks/may-2018-regent
s-remarks.pdf. 
 252. California Proposition 209, Affirmative Action Initiative (1996), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_209,_Affirmative_Action_Initiative_(1996).  In 
2020, voters in California rejected an effort to repeal Proposition 209.  California Proposition 16, 
Repeal Proposition 209 Affirmative Action Amendment (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.
org/California_Proposition_16,_Repeal_Proposition_209_Affirmative_Action_Amendment_(202
0). 
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ways to continue to take race and gender into account in ways that will be 
“invisible to outsiders.”253 
Diversity statements have been one of the more ingenious innovations of this 
initiative.254  Increasing faculty diversity is one of the key rationales for using 
mandatory diversity statements.  In UC, these statements are touted as a way to 
“increase the diversity of the applicant pool[]” despite the limitations of 
Proposition 209.255  Terms like “diverse students” or “underrepresented 
students” are thinly veiled “euphemisms” for race and ethnicity.256  These 
faculty diversity hiring initiatives are being measured expressly (and solely) 
based on whether more woman and minorities are being hired as a result of these 
policies.257 
 
 253. HEATHER MAC DONALD, THE DIVERSITY DELUSION: HOW RACE AND GENDER 
PANDERING CORRUPT THE UNIVERSITY AND UNDERMINE OUR CULTURE 35, 39 (2018). 
 254. UC’s Office of General Counsel expressly links the use of diversity statements to the goal 
of getting around the limits of Proposition 209. 
Proposition 209 prohibits UC from discriminating against or granting preferential 
treatment to individuals based on race, ethnicity, gender, or national origin.  However, 
diversity remains a central part of UC’s mission, and while Prop 209 eliminated some 
prior diversity tools, UC still has many strategies available for addressing race and gender 
equity in academic programs that comply with Prop 209.  UCOP has compiled many of 
these strategies in a set of guidelines.  Strategies in the area of faculty diversity include 
recognizing and rewarding diversity contributions in appointment and advancement, 
requesting a diversity statement from candidates, diversifying search committees, and 
incentivizing departments for increasing diversity. 
Minutes of Meeting, UC ACAD. SENATE, supra note 219, at 4. 
Other innovations include the President’s Postdoctoral Fellowship Program where postdoctoral 
scholars with a “demonstrated record of commitment to diversity” are hired as fellows and then 
departments are provided incentives to hire from this program for full-time faculty positions.  
Accountability Sub-Report on Diversity, supra note 250, at 6. 
 255. Guidelines for Enhancing Diversity at UC in the Context of Proposition 209, UNIVERSITY 
OF CALIFORNIA 1, 7 (Sept. 2016), https://diversity.universityofcalifornia.edu/files/documents/
prop-209-summary.pdf. 
 256. This is acknowledged even by supporters of affirmative action policies who are critical of 
the use of such “euphemisms.”  See Lindsey Malcom-Piqueux, Taking Equity-Minded Action to 
Close Equity Gaps, PEER REV. (Spring 2017), https://www.aacu.org/peerreview/2017/Spring/
Malcom-Piqueux. 
 257. UC OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL REPORT ON THE 2016-17 USE OF ONE-TIME FUNDS 
TO SUPPORT BEST PRACTICES IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN FACULTY EMPLOYMENT 
3–5 (Nov. 2017), https://www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/_files/reports/adv-fac-div-2016-17-final-
leg-report.pdf (evaluating the pilot programs exclusively based on how well they attracted women 
and minority applicants); UC OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL REPORT ON THE 2017−18 USE OF 
ONE-TIME FUNDS TO SUPPORT BEST PRACTICES IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN 
FACULTY EMPLOYMENT 2–3, 5 (Dec. 2018), https://www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/_files/report
s/adv-fac-div-2017-18-final-leg-report.pdf; Orientation Presentation PowerPoint, supra note 231, 
at 5 (focusing on “the success of avid use of the diversity statement and valuaing contributions to 
diversity in the selection process on attracting females and URMs); Accountability Sub-Report on 
Diversity, supra note 250, at 15 (“With this $6 million, UC has been able to support a coordinated 
systemwide program by awarding these funds on a competitive basis to support new efforts to 
increase LRE faculty diversity in selected units.”). 
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Departments are given strong incentives to consider and hire more minority 
students.258  The racial and gender composition of every search pool is 
scrutinized.259  An applicant pool that is inadequately diverse may be rejected 
by administrators and a department may be required to prolong its search.260  
Campuses that develop innovative approaches to increase diversity hiring are 
able to receive precious funding from the Advancing Faculty Diversity grants 
discussed above. 
Given all of the incentives for minority hiring, it is striking that faculty 
considering diversity are allowed to take into account “a candidates’ stated life 
experiences” when grading diversity statements.261  With the express directive 
to diversify, it is natural to think that faculty members will evaluate statements 
based on the race or gender or other characteristics of the applicant.  Indeed, 
sample statements provided to faculty members serving on a search committee 
 
 258. For instance, faculties are strongly incentivized to hire participants in the President’s 
Postdoctoral Fellowship Program (“PPFP”).  For each PPFP hire, the university gives the campus 
$85,000 per year for a five year period.  Janet Napolitano, President University of California, Letter 
regarding PPFP incentives (July 18, 2019), https://ppfp.ucop.edu/info/documents/hiring-incentive-
letter.6.18.14.pdf.  Such PPFP candidates can also qualify for a search waiver, which greatly 
expedites the hiring process and saves departments needed resources.  Email from Philip H. Kass, 
Vice Provost of Academic Affairs, UC Davis, President’s Postdoctoral and Chancellors’ 
Fellowship Program faculty hiring incentive (Jul. 31, 2019) (on file with author). 
 259. UC Berkeley requires new searches to expressly consider “how many women and 
underrepresented minorities have applied for past positions in your department or school, as a 
percentage of the total applicant pool” and to “redefin[e] departmental or school evaluation 
systems” if women or minorities are not hired.  UC BERKELEY, OFFICE FOR FACULTY EQUITY AND 
WELFARE, SEARCH GUIDE FOR SENATE FACULTY RECRUITMENTS: POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND 
PRACTICES (Apr. 7, 2017), https://ofew.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/senate_search_guide.pdf. 
 260. UC Davis encourages search committees to “ensure that qualified women and minorities 
are well represented in the applicant pool”, and states that “[r]equests may be denied or modified . 
. . if the proposed tenured level recruitment would significantly reduce the diversity of the applicant 
pool.”  OFFICE OF ACADEMIC AFFAIRS, UC DAVIS, RECRUITMENT SECTION UCD-500 (June 9, 
2011) https://academicaffairs.ucdavis.edu/sites/g/files/dgvnsk2376/files/inline-
files/UCD%20500.pdf.  In her book the Diversity Delusion, Heather Mac Donald recounts one 
particularly stark example: 
“Thus it was that UC San Diego’s electrical and computer engineering department a few 
years later found itself facing a mandate from campus administrators to hire a fourth 
female professor.  The possibility of a new hire had opened up—a rare opportunity in 
that budget climate—and after winnowing down hundreds of applicants, the department 
put forward its top candidates for on-campus interviews.  Scandalously, all were male.  
Word came down from on high that a female applicant who hadn’t even been close to 
making the initial cut must be interviewed.  She was duly brought to campus for an 
interview, but she got mediocre reviews.  The powers-that-be then spoke again: Her 
candidacy must be brought to a departmental vote.  In an unprecedented assertion of 
secrecy, the department chair refused to disclose the vote’s outcome and insisted on a 
second ballot.  After that second vote, the authorities finally gave up and dropped her 
candidacy.  Both vote counts remained secret.” 
MAC DONALD, supra note 253, at 175–76. 
 261. Orientation Presentation PowerPoint, supra note 231, at 21.   
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expressly disclosed an applicant’s own racial or ethnic background: One model 
statement notes that the applicant “left India at 18 years old to attend school in 
England.”262  Another is even more explicit: “I am a Mexican-American” the 
first sentence reads.263  The same pattern holds for a series of sample diversity 
statements from UC San Diego.  “As a woman in the sciences” one statement 
reads, “[a]s a Latino immigrant who lived in X, Y, and the United States” says 
another, and so on.264  It is no wonder that UC’s Academic Writing Center 
encourages applicants to “explain how your experiences as part of an 
underrepresented group in your field has impacted you[.]”265  If these are the 
model statements that students are encouraged to emulate and faculty members 
are encouraged to take into account when evaluating statements, then many 
female or minority applicants for faculty positions will likely expressly identify 
that in their statements.266  Faculty members will likely give in to the pressure 
to increase diversity by favoring applicants based on the applicants own 
expressed diversity. 
The evidence so far from the pilot programs at UC shows that the aggressive 
use of diversity statements has succeeded beyond even the wildest expectations 
of the diversity bureaucrats.  In 2018−2019, UC Davis conducted eight searches 
using diversity statements as an initial cut-off requirement.  32.7% of applicants 
for these positions were minorities compares to 9.3% of applicants for all other 
positions at UC Davis.267  This likely reflects aggressive outreach to expand the 
diversity of the pool, as well as the emphasis placed in promotion of these 
searched on racial diversity.  From total applicants to finalists, the pilot program 
 
 262. Orientation Presentation PowerPoint, supra note 231, at 19. 
 263. Id. at 20. 
 264. UC San Diego, Six Examples of Submitted Diversity Statements (redacted), 
https://physicalsciences.ucsd.edu/_files/examples-submitted-diversity-statements.pdf. 
 265. See Academic Writing Center, Writing a Diversity Statement for Academic Job 
Applicantion, UNIV. OF CAL. (Oct. 2018), https://www.uc.edu/content/dam/uc/aess/docs/AWC/
graduatehandouts/Diversity%20Statement%20(Accessible)%20%20.pdf. 
 266. One 2014 study suggested that less than a quarter of applicants making diversity 
statements at one particular university engaged in self-identification.  Sara L. Beck, Developing 
and Writing a Diversity Statement, VAND. UNIV. CTR. FOR TEACHING (2018), 
https://cft.vanderbilt.edu/guides-sub-pages/developing-and-writing-a-diversity-statement/.  Beck 
suggests that fear of implicit bias may weigh against disclosing personal identity.  Id.  But it seems 
likely that some of the features of the UC pilot programs will make self-disclosure more likely, 
since applicants will know that these statements will be evaluated independently and will be aware 
of the strong incentives in place in favor of advancing more minority applicants. 
The existence of implicit bias is highly contested.  See generally Heather Mac Donald, Are We All 
Unconscious Racists?, CITY J. (Autumn 2017), https://www.city-journal.org/html/are-we-all-
unconscious-racists-15487.html.  There is nevertheless a bit of irony in the fact that the proponents 
of diversity statements are also the most avid proponents of the contested theory of implicit bias. 
 267. UC OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL REPORT ON THE 2018−2019 USE OF ONE-TIME 
FUNDS TO SUPPORT THE BEST PRACTICES IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN FACULTY 
EMPLOYMENT, 22 (Dec. 2019), https://www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/_files/reports/adv-fac-div-
2018-19-final-leg-report.pdf. 
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pool jumped to 82.1% minority compared to a decrease to 5.7% for all other 
searches.268  This represents the application of the diversity statement screening.  
It is hard to believe that this degree of seemingly systematic elimination of White 
and Asian applicants could have happened without consideration of the 
applicants’ own racial or ethnic experiences.  Finally, a full 100% of the eight 
hires were ultimately underrepresented minorities compared to only 2.3% of the 
other hires at UC Davis that year.269  Such dramatic results are unlikely to be 
coincidental especially given the incentive and the institutional support to 
engage in racial discrimination. 
2.  Discrimination based on professorial viewpoint 
Mandatory diversity statements have been heavily critiqued as the “new 
loyalty oath.”270  Jeffrey Flier, the former dean of Harvard University’s medical 
school said that these statements are an “affront to academic freedom” that 
“diminishes the true value of diversity, equity of inclusion by trivializing it.”271  
Flier further declared that “[s]uch requirements risk introducing a political 
litmus test into faculty hiring and reviews.”272  The Oregon Association of 
Scholars has noted that “[w]hile in theory, the concepts of diversity, equity, and 
inclusion could be interpreted in ways consistent with different political 
viewpoints, in practice they have been consistently and exclusively defined by 
university officials to emphasize the values and assumptions of left-wing 
viewpoints in society.” 273 
 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. John O. McGinnis, The University of California’s New Loyalty Oath, L. & LIBERTY (Oct. 
30, 2018), https://www.lawliberty.org/2018/10/30/the-university-of-californias-new-loyalty-oath/; 
Michael Tennant, “Diversity Statements:” Academia’s New Loyalty Oath, THE NEW AM. (Apr. 30, 
2019), https://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/education/item/32153-diversity-statements-
academia-s-new-loyalty-oath.  See also Christian Schneider, Secular universities now demand a 
‘profession of faith’, N.Y. POST (Apr. 26, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/04/26/secular-
universities-now-demand-a-profession-of-faith/; Max Diamond, Pledging Allegiance to Diversity, 
and to the Tenure for Which It Stands, REAL CLEAR INVESTIGATIONS (Oct. 23, 2018), 
https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2018/10/18/i_pledge_allegiance_to_diversity_an
d_to_the_tenure_for_which_it_stands.html; Mark J. Perry, Quotation of the day on university 
corruption and the lack of diversity when it comes to ideology, AM. ENTER. INST. (Mar. 27, 2019), 
https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/quotation-of-the-day-on-university-corruption-and-the-lack-of-
diversity-when-it-come-to-ideology/; Ortner, supra note 12. 
 271. Colleen Flaherty, Making a Statement on Diversity Statements, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 
12, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/11/12/former-harvard-deans-tweet-
against-required-faculty-diversity-statements-sets-debate. 
 272. Flier, supra note 12. 
 273. OR. ASS’N OF SCHOLARS, supra note 198. 
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On the other hand, supporters of diversity statements have declared that those 
expressing these fears are “scaremongering”274 and that diversity statements will 
only ensure that faculty members are equipped to handle the growing diversity 
of students in their classrooms.275 
Despite the well-intended defenders, there are reasons to believe that the 
critics’ fears are well-founded. 
For one thing, the proponents of these statements have been the most willing 
to express the position that contrary views have no place on the university 
campus.  For instance, Tanya Golash-Boza, a Professor of Sociology at 
University of California Merced, wrote a piece in Inside Higher Ed entitled “The 
Effective Diversity Statement.”276  In that article, Golash-Boza emphasizes that 
applicants who “do not care about diversity and equity” should not “waste [their] 
time” applying for academic positions at universities with such a demand.277  
She further notes that while “many faculty members overtly reject campus 
efforts to enhance diversity and equity,” these statements are being carefully 
read by faculty members that care about these topics.  Golash-Boza also 
encourages applicants to “acknowledge your privilege” and to focus on 
“commonly recognized form[s] of oppression” like “racial oppression, sexism, 
homophobia, transphobia, [and] ableism.”278  Another guide on diversity 
statements encourages applicants to avoid “inappropriate examples” such as 
“[p]erpetuating the idea that we are all equal - including in regard to access and 
potential for success.”279 
Furthermore, the very idea of a diversity statement is rooted in theories that 
rely on contested notions such as “critical race theory.”  As Professor Flier has 
explained, 
One way to understand the problem is to examine the academic 
literature regarding equity and inclusion today.  This literature, though 
not uniform, often incorporates key elements of a theoretical corpus 
known as “critical race theory,” little known to many academics 
outside of the social sciences and the humanities.  It emphasizes 
 
 274. See Canning & Reddick, supra note 12.  The authors nevertheless acknowledge the risk 
of the “bureaucratization of diversity” if diversity statements “ask faculty members . . . to toe a line 
or embrace a single ideology.”  Id. 
 275. Id.; see also Carmen Mitchell, Why Colleges Should Require Faculty Diversity 
Statements, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2018/
11/15/benefits-faculty-diversity-statements-opinion (“So why go further and require an EDI 
[equity, diversity, and inclusion] statement?  Because faculty members also play a role in fostering 
an inclusive environment through teaching and scholarship.”). 
 276. Tanya Golash-Boza, The Effective Diversity Statement, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 10, 
2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2016/06/10/how-write-effective-diversity-state
ment-essay. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Diversity Statements, INDIANA UNIV. BLOOMINGTON CTR. FOR INNOVATIVE TEACHING 
AND LEARNING, https://citl.indiana.edu/programs/ai-support/resources/diversity-statements.html. 
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structural racism, white privilege and supremacy, microaggressions, 
economically driven power relationships, and intersectionality. At the 
level of policy, it favors “race conscious” rather than “color blind” 
approaches to remedies . . .  But it is obvious that these ideas and policy 
frameworks are not politically neutral.  Rather, they map onto the 
left/progressive wing of the political spectrum, and their claims are 
arguable and highly contested.  This ideological context is hardly 
subtle[.]280 
The very concepts of “diversity” and “equity” are, therefore, not politically 
neutral or immune from debate.  As one article on diversity published by the 
Association of American Colleges & Universities puts it, “equity-mindedness” 
requires “race-consciousness” and the embrace of explicit affirmative action 
programs.281  As another article explains, “[e]quity-minded individuals are . . . 
color-conscious” as well as “[w]illing to assume responsibility for the 
elimination of inequality.”282 
Supporters of this doctrine of diversity are quick to vilify those who disagree 
with them.  For instance, Sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva in his influential 
Racism without Racists explains that the concept of colorblindness is part of a 
“racial ideology” that is imposed by majority racial groups in order to perpetuate 
power dynamics and preserve the racial status quo.283  Bonilla-Silva refers to 
concepts of equal treatment and colorblindness as types of “abstract liberalism,” 
which “ignore[s] the multiple institutional and state-sponsored practices behind 
segregation and being unconcerned about these practices’ negative 
consequences for minorities.”284  But Bonilla-Silva’s theory has many critics as 
well.  For instance, Professor John Staddon has argued that this framework of 
colorblind racism relies on faulty assumptions and a lack of any empirical 
evidence.285 
Thus, diversity statement rubrics engage in viewpoint discrimination when 
they penalize candidates who “[m]ay provide reasons for not considering 
diversity in hiring, or sees it as antithetical to academic freedom or the 
 
 280. Flier, supra note 12. 
 281. Lindsey Malcom-Piqueux, supra note 256. 
 282. See also Estela Mara Bensimon, Alicia C. Dowd & Keith Witham, Five Principles for 
Enacting Equity by Design, 19 DIVERSITY & DEMOCRACY (Winter 2016), https://www.aacu.org/
diversitydemocracy/2016/winter/bensimon (explaining that “equity” required “accounting for 
differences in individual attributes and experiences for the purposes of achieving equal outcomes”). 
 283. EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS 2–3 (4th ed. 2018). 
 284. Id. at 56. 
 285. John Staddon, The New Racism, Part I: How ‘Race and Ethnic Studies’ Made Color 
Blindness a Bad Thing, JAMES G. MARTIN CTR. FOR ACAD. RENEWAL (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2018/08/the-new-racism-part-1-how-race-and-ethnic-studies-
made-color-blindness-a-bad-thing/; See Thomas Sowell, “Affirmative Action”: A Worldwide 
Disaster, COMMENT. (Dec. 1989) https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/affirmative-
action-a-worldwide-disaster/. 
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university’s research mission”286 or who “may state that it’s better not to have 
outreach or affinity groups aimed at underrepresented individuals because it 
keeps them separate from everyone else, or will make them feel less valued.”287  
These statements are squarely being employed on one side of a lingering 
academic debate288 of significant importance for the nature of the academy and 
the future of the country.289 
UC Davis Mathematics Chair Abigail Thompson distilled this point very 
effectively in a recent essay critiquing the use of mandatory diversity statements: 
Why is it a political test?  Politics are a reflection of how you believe 
society should be organized.  Classical liberals aspire to treat every 
person as a unique individual, not as a representative of their gender 
or their ethnic group.  The sample rubric dictates that in order to get a 
high diversity score, a candidate must have actively engaged in 
promoting different identity groups as part of their professional life.  
The candidate should demonstrate “clear knowledge of, experience 
with, and interest in dimensions of diversity that result from different 
identities” and describe “multiple activities in depth.”  Requiring 
 
 286. Berkeley Rubric, supra note 242; see supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.  
 287. Id.; Berkeley Rubric, supra note 242. 
 288. See John Staddon, The Devolution of Social Science, QUILLETTE (Oct. 7, 2018), 
https://quillette.com/2018/10/07/the-devolution-of-social-science/. 
 289. From speaking with those inside the UC system, it is clear that these statements are being 
evaluated in a narrow and ideological fashion looking for a particular kind of diversity, rather than 
broadly to encompass other types of diversity such as ideological or religious diversity.  On his 
blog, John Cochrane notes a conversation he had with UC colleagues: 
My friends (anonymous!) in the UC system report that the criteria are clear and the word 
is out: Don’t try to be clever.  Don’t quote Martin Luther King, on judgement by content 
of character rather than color of skin.  Don’t write vibrant essays on the importance of 
ideological, political or religious diversity.  Don’t quote federal anti-discrimination law, 
the 14th Amendment, and the UC’s own statements of non-discrimination in hiring.  
Don’t write about class diversity, diverse experiences of immigrants, such as people born 
under communism in Eastern Europe or the amazingly diverse experience of the 
colleague you just hired who came from a small village in China.  Don’t write about the 
importance of freedom on speech, or anti-communist loyalty oaths in the 1950s.  Are you  
thinking of writing about your hilbilly elegy background, your time in the military, your 
support for gun rights and Trump, and how this background and viewpoint would enrich 
a faculty and staff that likely has absolutely zero people like you?  Don’t bother.  We all 
know what “diversity” means.  And, heaven forbid, don’t express distaste for the project.  
The staff are on to all these tricks, and each of these specifically will earn you a 
downgrade. 
John Cochrane, Wokeademia, THE GRUMPY ECONOMIST: JOHN COCHRANE’S BLOG (Jan. 30, 
2020), https://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2020/01/wokeademia.html.  My personal 
conversations with current UC faculty, as well as those who have recently applied to UC are 
consistent with what Cochrane writes. 
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candidates to believe that people should be treated differently 
according to their identity is indeed a political test.290 
3.  Discrimination Based on Research Viewpoint 
UC’s Guidelines for Evaluating Contributions to Diversity for Faculty 
Appointment and Promotion Under APM – 210 set out the kinds of research 
endeavors that would give a faculty member credit for a contribution to 
diversity.291 
Research contributions to understanding the barriers facing women 
and minorities in academic disciplines, for example: 
• Studying patterns of participation and advancement of 
women and minorities in fields where they are under-
represented 
• Studying socio-cultural issues confronting under-represented 
students in college preparation curricula 
• Evaluating programs, curricula, and teaching strategies 
designed to enhance participation of under-represented 
students in higher education 
Research interests that will contribute to diversity and equal 
opportunity, for example, research that addresses: 
• Race, ethnicity, gender, multiculturalism, and inclusion 
• Health disparities, educational access and achievement, 
political engagement, economic justice, social mobility, civil 
and human rights 
• Questions of interest to communities historically excluded by 
higher education 
• Artistic expression and cultural production that reflects 
culturally diverse communities or voices not well represented 
in the arts and humanities292 
 
 290. Thompson, supra note 13, at 1778.  In response to the backlash her article engendered, 
Thompson further elaborated on this process: 
It is a misunderstanding to interpret my essay as an attack on the concepts of diversity 
and inclusiveness.  There are constructive and destructive ways to achieve these goals.  
Some involve being helpful and welcoming, and being thoughtful about opening doors 
to the previously excluded.  Others are destructive.  They require adherence to a very 
particular view on identity and social justice.  Destructive approaches alienate people 
who should be working together towards an inclusive community.  Mandatory DEI 
statements are divisive and destructive. 
John Cochrane, More Wokeademia, THE GRUMPY ECONOMIST (Jan. 31, 2020) https://johnh
cochrane.blogspot.com/2020/01/more-wokeademia.html (quoting an email from Thompson). 
 291. UCOP Academic Personnel and Programs, Evaluating Contributions to Diversity for 
Faculty Appointment and Promotion Under APM – 210, UC SAN DIEGO 1, 4 (Feb. 2017), https://
www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/policies-guidelines/eval-contributions-diversity.pdf. 
 292. Id. 
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It is not hard to see how this list will result in favoritism to certain kinds of 
viewpoints at the expense of others.  Consider, for instance, a sample EDI 
statement provided by UCLA’s Office of Equity, Diversity, and Inclusion.  Since 
this statement is being offered as a sample or model, it is likely one that would 
score highly under UCLA’s criteria.  This prospective faculty member 
emphasizes that his “research broadly focuses on the socioeconomic, civic, and 
political integration of post-1965 immigrants and their children,” and that he 
encourages students “through their scholarship and advocacy, to alleviate [] the 
vast inequities that continue to shape our world.”293  This statement is held up 
as a model diversity statement. 
Imagine, in contrast, a statement written by a sociologist whose research 
focuses on how inequality is fundamental to society’s progress and how free 
market systems in the long run drastically reduce poverty and improve quality 
of life.294  It is unlikely that this statement would receive a positive score, let 
alone be held up as a model for others to emulate. 
Or imagine two prospective law professors.  One publishes an article strongly 
supporting affirmative action programs.  Another argues that affirmative action 
programs are harmful because they create mismatch and are incompatible with 
the ideals of the equal protection clause.  The first professor will get a high score 
on his contributions to diversity, while the second professor will receive low 
marks and may be excluded under the search method being utilized in UC Davis 
and elsewhere.  In a highly competitive academic marketplace, this process of 
giving additional credit to certain kinds of research is likely to skew the academy 
even further away from conservative ideas and intellectual diversity. 
4.  Requirement that all Professors Dedicate Themselves to Contributing to 
Diversity 
John O. McGinnis has analogized diversity statements to statements of faith 
required by Oxford and Cambridge Universities after the English 
Reformation.295  However, as McGinnis insightfully notes, these modern 
statements of faith require more than just intellectual assent: “[t]he old 
requirement of the British colleges was at least less intrusive.  One had to profess 
a set of beliefs but did not have to do anything to advance their social realization.  
But under the California policy, a prospective faculty member must advance a 
designated social mission to advance his or her career.”296 
Take the rubrics used by UC Berkeley and UC Santa Cruz in their Advancing 
Faculty Diversity pilot programs.  An applicant who “mentions activities that 
 
 293. Example EDI Statements, UCLA https://ucla.app.box.com/v/sample-EDI-statements. 
 294. See e.g. Phillip Aghion, et. al., Innovation and Top Income Inequality, 86 REV. ECON. 
STUDIES 1 (2019), (arguing that while innovation can increase income inequality it can also 
dramatically increase social mobility); Mark Tovey, The Social Function of Economic Inequality, 
MISES INSTITUTE (Dec. 19, 2014), https://mises.org/library/social-function-economic-inequality. 
 295. See McGinnis, supra note 270. 
 296. Id. 
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are already the expectation of faculty as evidence of commitment and 
involvement” such as “always invit[ing] and welcom[ing] students from all 
backgrounds to participate in [a] research lab” or being willing to mentor women 
or minority students would get a low (likely failing) score on her statement.297  
Nor would faculty members receive credit for “[d]escrib[ing] only activities that 
are already the expectation of our faculty such as mentoring, treating all students 
the same regardless of background, etc.”298  So, faculty are expected not only to 
fulfill all administrative expectations for their service, but to go beyond that. 
Of course, a university may require professors to implement a variety of 
diversity related programs and policies.  For instance, it may require a professor 
to undergo implicit bias training, even if the professor does not accept the 
premise of implicit bias.  But what UC is doing is different.  It is not merely 
requiring a professor to embrace university policy, but to be a champion of it.  A 
professor is not allowed to do the bare minimum, but is expected to go beyond 
that and affirmatively embrace the university’s policies on diversity.  A 
professor who chooses to dedicate his time to other causes that are not seen as 
advancing diversity may not even be considered after evaluation of his diversity 
statement, regardless of how valuable that service may be to the campus 
community or society.299 
III.  DIVERSITY STATEMENTS ARE PART OF A LARGER TREND HERALDING THE 
NEED FOR GREATER PROTECTION OF PROFESSORIAL FREE SPEECH RIGHTS 
As the above discussion shows, mandatory diversity statements pose a unique 
threat to faculty diversity of thought.  But diversity statements are not the only 
emerging threat that faculty face.  In recent decades, the academic profession 
has undergone significant modifications, which have undermined the power of 
the faculty and empowered bureaucrats who prioritize concerns such as diversity 
far above values like free speech.  Accordingly, this section seeks to place 
diversity statements in the context of a variety of other ongoing changes to 
academia, which weaken institutional academic freedom protections for 
individual professors. 
Scholars critical of the free speech claims of individual professors have argued 
that academic norms and informal rules like those adopted by the American 
 
 297. UCSC Starting Rubric to Assess Candidate Contributions to Diversity, Equity, and 
Inclusion, UC SANTA CRUZ, 2 https://apo.ucsc.edu/policy/communications/docs/ucsc-rubrics-c2
deistatements.pdf. 
 298. Id. at 3. 
 299. Cochrane, supra note 289. 
Suppose you spent all your copious free time as a scientist activating for climate 
change, working as a drug addiction counselor, teaching in prisons, or saving 
endangered species.  None of that counts.  Of course if you spent your time as a 
Mormon missionary, activating for second amendment rights, or working for 
the Federalist society, we know that doesn’t count! 
Id. 
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Association of University Professors (“AAUP”) are adequate to protect the free 
speech rights of faculty members.300  Whether or not that was ever the case, the 
argument seems increasingly outdated in light of these trends.301 
A.  More and more decisions are being shifted to bureaucrats who prioritize 
“diversity” rather than intellectual freedom. 
In the last several decades, academic institutions have increasingly become 
bureaucratized as administrative hires dramatically outpace the growth of 
faculty.302  Although not an entirely new phenomenon,303 this trend has 
continued to accelerate. 
At the same time, “diversity discourse” has become central to the operation of 
Universities.  University officials such as deans, presidents, and chancellors are 
chosen to a significant degree based on willingness to promote and increase 
diversity focused initiatives.304  There have been few dissenters among the ranks 
of the University administration from the consensus in favor of diversity 
programs such as affirmative action.305  On the other hand, faculty has been more 
resistant to such efforts.  For instance, one 1996 poll “found that 57 percent of 
professors at UC-Berkeley” did not believe that their institution should “grant 
preference to one applicant over another for admission on the basis of race, sex[,] 
or ethnicity.”306  By contrast, more than two-thirds of the fifteen administrators 
surveyed by Lipson at UC-Berkley supported affirmative action programs.307  
These surveys suggest significant disparity between the attitudes of faculty and 
administrators towards diversity issues. 
Debates over the reason why administrators have so completely embraced a 
particular view of diversity are rampant.  Some scholars argue that these pro-
 
 300. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text; infra note 350 and accompanying text. 
 301. See Neal H. Hutchens et al., Essay: Faculty, the Courts, and the First Amendment, 120 
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2016) (“With many faculty increasingly lacking the protections of 
tenure, questions and debate abound over the future prospects of faculty independence and 
academic freedom.”); Martins, supra note 160, at 690 (“The realities of today’s public colleges 
undermine the confidence one should place in university officials to render objective academic 
judgments.  In many universities, school administrators, rather than academic experts in the relevant 
field, are the ones evaluating professor speech.”). 
 302. GINSBERG, supra note 200, at 27 (noting that while faculty only grew 50% from 1985-
2005, administrators grew 85% and staff 240%). 
 303. See HENRY ROSOVSKY, THE UNIVERSITY: AN OWNER’S MANUAL 13 (bemoaning that 
“the quality of a school is negatively correlated with the unrestrained power of administrators . . . 
”). 
 304. The selection process for Presidents and other administrators is increasingly led by 
corporate search firms with little faculty input.  Ginsberg, supra note 200, at 5. 
 305. Daniel N. Lipson, Embracing Diversity: The Institutionalization of Affirmative Action as 
Diversity Management at UC-Berkeley, UT-Austin, and UT-Madison, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 985, 
997 (2007). 
 306. Id. at 998. 
 307. Id. at 999. 
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diversity administrators have captured the university. 308  Other scholars push 
back on the “capture theory” narrative, emphasizing instead that campus 
administrators tend to select their profession based on a commitment to diversity 
and support for affirmative action and other diversity programs.309  University 
administrators face increased pressure from the media, accreditation agencies, 
employers, and other interested parties to increase diversity.310  There is also a 
lingering debate over whether these diversity efforts are genuine or whether 
those proposing them do so out of cynical motivation, such as ensuring job 
security,311 or shifting power from the faculty to the administration.312  Whether 
or not the increasing role for “diversity” in University admissions, hiring, and 
student and faculty life is seen as a cynical ploy for power, it is nevertheless a 
striking and seemingly enduring change. 
Regardless of the reason, the growth in the so called “diversity bureaucracy” 
is staggering: In 2018, the Economist noted that there are around 175 employees 
at the University of California, Berkeley who are classified as “diversity 
officials.”313  The need to comply with regulatory mandates cannot fully account 
for this meteoric growth.314  Bureaucrats now outnumber faculty 2:1 at most 
public universities.315 
As more and more functions of the university are shifted to bureaucrats, there 
is reason to be concerned as to whether these bureaucrats, many of whom have 
no academic background whatsoever,316 are sufficiently concerned with the First 
 
 308. Id. at 1008–09. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 1016–17. 
 311. Id. at 1005.  Some affirmative-action critics, such as former UC Regent Ward Connerly, 
have suggested that commitment of university officials to diversity is “superficial” and exists “to 
give constitutional protection and to justify their budget.”  Id. at 1005–06; See also John Staddon, 
Diversity and Inclusion of Identity Groups Often Means Uniformity and Exclusion of Ideas, JAMES 
G. MARTIN CTR. FOR ACAD. RENEWAL (June 13, 2018) https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2018/06/
diversity-and-inclusion-of-identity-groups-often-means-uniformity-and-exclusion-of-ideas/.  This 
seems unlikely in the face of decades of dedicated effort to promote diversity programs, and the 
ideological litmus test nature of more recent efforts, such as the mandatory diversity statement. 
 312. Ginsberg, supra note 200, at 101 (“Put simply, university administrators will often 
package proposals designed mainly to enhance their own power on campus as altruistic and public-
spirited efforts to promote social and political goals, such as equality and diversity, that the faculty 
cannot oppose.”).  “[U]nder the rubric of diversity, administrators are seeking and finding ways to 
enhance their power vis-a-vis the faculty.”  Id. at 116. 
 313. The Rise of Universities Diversity Bureaucrats, THE ECONOMIST: THE ECONOMIST 
EXPLAINS (May 8, 2018), https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/05/08/the-
rise-of-universities-diversity-bureaucrats. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Dan Berrett, The Fall of the Faculty, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (July 14, 2011), https://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2011/07/14/fall-faculty (interview with Benjamin Ginsberg) (discussing 
the shift away from part-time academic deans to full-time administrators without academic 
experience). 
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Amendment and with professorial academic freedom.317  Indeed, these 
bureaucratic mandates often “make a mockery of the core academic mission.”318  
There is also reason to think that the norms and mores of the growing 
bureaucracy have undermined faculty support for freedom of expression.319  The 
bureaucratization of the university has, therefore, led to increased prominence 
of individuals who value diversity far more highly than they value open inquiry 
and academic freedom. 
B.  Undermining of Tenure 
A related concern is the undermining of the tenure system.  For over a century, 
tenure has protected faculty from termination for the expression of unpopular 
viewpoints.320  Indeed, it can be said that “[t]enure is the chief guarantor of the 
intellectual freedom that makes it possible for faculty members to pursue new 
ideas and to teach concepts in the sciences and humanities that fly in the face of 
conventionally accepted wisdom.”321  Those tenured professors that were fired 
for speech related activities were, therefore, often the Ward Churchill’s of the 
 
 317. Some scholars have argued that “[f]aculty peers . . . sometimes pose a greater threat to the 
academic freedom of individual professors” than a government or the university administration.  
David M. Rabban, Symposium on Academic Freedom: Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty 
Autonomy?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1988).  This, of course, may be true with instances of 
individual personality conflicts or other clashes.  But by and large faculty has greater incentive to 
be protective of the rights of other faculty members than administrators.  After all, faculty members 
may need to rely on the same protections at some point in their career.  Moreover, as Greg Lukianoff 
has characterized in his Unlearning Liberty, the “[t]he actual regimes of censorship on campus are 
put in place primarily by the ever-growing army of administrators” who “present themselves as 
benign philosopher-kings.”  GREG LUKIANOFF, UNLEARNING LIBERTY: CAMPUS CENSORSHIP 
AND THE END OF THE AMERICAN DEBATE (2014); See also Henry Reichman, Academic Freedom 
and the Common Good: A Review Essay, AAUP J. OF ACAD. FREEDOM, 16−18 (2016), 
https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/Reichman_1.pdf; GINSBERG, supra note 200 (“[M]ost 
professors view scholarship and teaching as ends and the university as an institutional means or 
instrument through which to achieve those ends.  For administrators, on the other hand, it is the 
faculty’s research and teaching enterprise that is the means and not the end.”). 
 318. Matthew Abraham, Book Review: The Fall of the Faculty: The Rise of the All 
Administrative University, LOGOS, http://logosjournal.com/2016/abraham-2/ (last visited Mar. 27, 
2021).   
 319. JONATHAN R. COLE, STEPHEN COLE & CHRISTOPHER WEISS, Academic Freedom: a Pilot 
Study of Faculty Views, in WHO’S AFRAID OF ACAD. FREEDOM 364 (Akeel Bilgrami & Jonathan 
R. Cole eds., 2015).  The authors stated, “In fact, the unwillingness to accept the idea that speakers 
have a right to hurt others, feelings and offend their sensibilities may lead faculty members to think 
of academic freedom and free inquiry as just another value of the university without any special 
place among this hierarchy of values.”  Id. at 366. 
 320. MICHAEL BÉRUBÉ & JENNIFER RUTH, THE HUMANITIES, HIGHER EDUCATION, AND 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM 115–16 (2015) (“With the erosion of the professionalism once 
institutionalized by the tenure system . . . the university community has not blossomed into a vibrant 
democracy but reverted to the kind of demeaning and resentful culture typical of patronage 
systems.”). 
 321. Churchill was ultimately awarded $1 in damages by a jury for his improper termination.  
See GINSBERG, supra note 200, at 156. 
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academy—professors known for their especially offensive and controversial 
speech.322  By and large, professors were protected.  However, in recent decades, 
there has been a dramatic shift away from tenure and towards non-tenured 
adjunct or contract professors.323  This shift has further empowered 
administrators and professional staff at the expense of faculty members.324  Non-
tenured faculty may also be less protective of academic freedom and freedom of 
expression in the academy more generally.325 
C.  Bypassing Faculty Governance 
At most academic institutions, faculty senates have traditionally played a 
major role in university governance and protected faculty speech and due 
process rights.326  That is certainly true in the UC system, but that role is being 
undermined.327 
As discussed above, diversity bureaucrats in the UC system have bypassed 
the need to dialogue with the Faculty Senate at all through the use of special 
diversity pilot programs.  Even when the faculty is consulted, their concerns are 
being ignored or marginalized.328  This tendency to bypass the institutions 
established to protect professorial speech rights suggests that more robust legal 
protections for professors are needed as the institutional forces that kept conflict 
between academics and institutions at bay lose their legitimacy and prestige.329 
 
 322. Id. at 155–56. 
 323. Hutchens, et al., supra note 301, at 1029; Abraham, supra note 318; 
That administrators conspire to marginalize the faculty voice, undermine tenure, 
and scuttle shared governance principles within their institutions is undoubtedly 
true.  The move to increasingly rely upon contingent labor gives administrations 
yet another way to control the faculty.  Since non-tenure-track faculty can be 
dismissed at a moment’s notice, administrators do not have to be bothered with 
the resistance of the faculty when it comes to changing the curriculum, scuttling 
meritorious research, or controlling once-successful programs. 
Id. 
 324. Ginsberg, supra note 200, at 115–16 (“But, while they do not produce much actual 
diversity administrative diversity campaigns have given university officials a tool with which to 
attack the autonomy of the faculty recruitment and promotion process and, perhaps, the tenure 
system itself.”). 
 325. COLE, supra note 319, at 364. 
 326. LARRY G. GERBER, DECLINE OF FACULTY GOVERNANCE: PROFESSIONALIZATION AND 
THE MODERN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY 5–10 (2014). 
 327. Jason Fertig, Faculty Senate Shrugged, JAMES G. MARTIN CTR. FOR ACAD. RENEWAL 
(Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2016/08/faculty-senate-shrugged/ (“The idea of 
a senate representing faculty members is an old one, but in the contemporary university full of 
credentialism and administrative bloat, the relevance of that body is questionable.”). 
 328. See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text. 
 329. See Robert J. Tepper & Craig G. White, Speak No Evil: Academic Freedom and the 
Application of Garcetti v. Ceballos to Public University Faculty, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 125, 146 
(2009) (“[W]here shared governance is weak, an institutional view of academic freedom may 
empower administrators to make decisions affecting academic matters without building a 
consensus among the faculty.”); Larry Hubbell, Thankless But Vital: The Role of the Faculty Senate 
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Professorial hiring is an area of particular vulnerability.  While faculty 
members are likely to be highly protective of other current faculty members, 
they are less likely to have regard for those who are not yet hired and are merely 
potential hires, and to expend their dwindling institutional capital on preventing 
bureaucratic capture of the hiring process.  This is perhaps why UC has been 
able to implement mandatory diversity statements for faculty hires with such 
limited pushback, but has met much more significant resistance in its efforts with 
current faculty members.330 
D.  Steps outside of the qualifications of a particular discipline. 
Traditionally, professors are part of a particular discipline with academic rules 
and norms.  These norms are ultimately protective of professorial academic 
freedom because a professor applying for a position, for tenure, or for 
advancement can rely on the application of these intra-disciplinary norms.  But 
schools like UC Davis have begun instead to utilize open hiring for inter-
disciplinary positions.331  This process of interdisciplinary and cluster hiring is 
increasingly common in universities as part of diversity hiring efforts.332  This 
shift opens the door for greater subjectivity in the process.  Because a single set 
of academic norms do not govern, there is more room for diversity bureaucrats 
to impose additional viewpoint-based considerations without oversight.333 
 
Chair, THOUGHT & ACTION (Fall 2010), 
qa16.nea.org/assets/img/PubThoughtAndAction/Hubbelshort.pdf.  
A key lesson I learned is that the faculty senate chair must always be cognizant that he 
or she is representing the faculty.  It is easy to lose sight of this obligation, given the 
temptations of the office.  If one is an effective faculty senate chair and is 
acknowledged to be such by members of the administration, future benefits may 
follow—such as a position within the administration, if one so desires.  However, one’s 
ambition to pursue a career in administration must not soften one’s advocacy of faculty 
interests, which may, at times, differ from the interests of the administration and the 
trustees.  A heightened sense of careerism can easily lead to an overly deferential 
approach in dealing with administrators. 
Id. 
 330. See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text. 
 331. UC DAVIS, supra note 233 (“The searches will be college or school-wide, without 
specification of a specific discipline or department, provided that an applicant’s area of expertise 
falls within a discipline embodied in the academic unit.  The goal of these broad searches is to 
attract the widest possible pool of candidates.”). 
 332. Successful Development of a Faculty Cluster-Hiring Program at NC State University, NC 
STATE UNIV., https://facultyclusters.ncsu.edu/creating-a-culture-of-interdisciplinary-excellence/ 
(last visited Nov. 19, 2021) (employing an “interdisciplinary tenure committee” among other 
innovations); Colleen Flaherty, Cluster Hiring and Diversity, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 1, 2015), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/05/01/new-report-says-cluster-hiring-can-lead-
increased-faculty-diversity. 
 333. Rabban, supra note 317, at 1410 (“Peer review helps assure that the decision rests on valid 
professional grounds and thus is itself a contribution to academic freedom.  When people without 
the relevant scholarly background make these judgments, it may become difficult to avoid 
suspicions that inappropriate, nonprofessional considerations played a significant role.”). 
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Peer review has traditionally been one of the key pillars of robust academic 
freedom.334  By shifting evaluation from peers to inter-disciplinary committees, 
or even to non-academic diversity bureaucrats, one of the key safeguards for 
professorial academic freedom is lost.335 
An Urban Universities for Health study on Faculty Cluster Hiring for 
Diversity and Institutional Climate shows how viewpoint bias may be more 
likely to infect such searches.336  Some of the searches surveyed originate from 
offices or committees focused on diversity issues rather than from members of 
the faculty.337  In one instance, “women and diversity ‘allies’ r[a]n the hiring 
process.”338  In other instances, these searches are organized “around specific 
disciplines which tend to be more diverse or diversity-related research 
topics.”339  Diversity training for members of the search committee is also a 
ubiquitous feature.340  All of these features make these types of interdisciplinary 
searches more likely to focus heavily on diversity and to be less protective of 
diversity of opinion.  This is exactly what appears to have happened in the 
faculty hiring initiatives at UC Davis and Berkeley that were described above. 
Similarly, a large wave of cluster hiring at UC Riverside was criticized 
because it led to faculty accusations of “administrators [] controlling the 
proposal selection process and selecting clusters arbitrarily or, worse, for their 
own ends.  The massive cluster-hiring initiative also seemed to be overtaking 
 
 334. The classic conception of faculty autonomy “rested on the guarantee of quality provided 
by disciplinary bodies whose role is to establish and implement norms and standards and so to 
certify their members’ professional competence.”  Joan W. Scott, Knowledge, Power, and 
Academic Freedom, 76 SOC. RSCH. 451, 460 (2009), https://culturahistorica.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/scott-knowledge.pdf. 
 335. In FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, Finkin and Post argue 
that academic freedom should be primarily defended on the basis of institutional academic freedom 
rather than individual rights.  The linchpins for their idealized system of academic freedom include 
“the professional norms necessary to define and generate knowledge” and the need for “those who 
exercise the prerogative of peer review [to] interpret disciplinary standards in a manner that 
maintains the internal legitimacy of these standards.”  Because these norms prevail, Finkin and Post 
argue that academic institutions must be given the ability to “preserve sufficient social cohesion 
within the profession” and to “maintain a sensible and wise equilibrium between innovation and 
stability.”  Matthew F. Finkin & Robert Post, supra note 137, at 60.  Finkin and Post do not reckon 
with the extent to which such disciplinary norms have been undermined in the name of mounting 
institutional bureaucracy and the forced blurring of disciplinary lines.  These trends suggest that 
institutional norms academic freedom will become increasingly inadequate to protect free speech 
rights without increasing judicial and constitutional intervention.  Id. 
 336. Faculty Cluster Hiring for Diversity and Institutional Climate, URBAN UNIVS. FOR 
HEALTH 1, 10 (Apr. 2015), urbanuniversitiesforhealth.org/media/documents/Faculty_
Cluster_Hiring_Report.pdf. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 12. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
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established, department-level search procedures.”341  A majority of the 
respondents to a survey related to the program said that “their own departments’ 
hiring strategies were inconsistent with the cluster strategy” or that “the cluster 
strategy interfered with their departments’ strategies.”342 
As these kinds of programs become more common, prospective, or current, 
faculty members increasingly will not be protected by the professional norms of 
their academic disciplines, suggesting a greater need for constitutional 
protection. 
E.  Effort to detach considerations of diversity from overall considerations of 
merit. 
Traditionally, the evaluation of a faculty applicant or a current faculty member 
seeking tenure has been a highly holistic and integrated process, and this is one 
of the reasons that such searches largely have been protected from judicial 
scrutiny.343  In contrast, universities such as UC Davis have begun considering 
diversity statements as an initial threshold requirement with no other facets of 
an application being considered.344  This exacerbates the risk that applicants will 
not be treated as individuals, but will be grouped solely based on their personal 
characteristics or viewpoint on the singular topic of diversity.  On the other hand, 
the single-minded focus on diversity statements actually eliminates the risk of 
courts sitting as a “super-tenure” committee,345 since there is only a single factor 
that needs to be evaluated to determine if improper discrimination entered into 
the mix. 
 
 341. Colleen Flaherty, Cluster-Hiring Cluster &%*#?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Feb. 1, 2016 3:00 
AM), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/02/01/uc-riverside-faculty-survey-suggests-out
rage-cluster-hiring-initiative. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 1984) (listing “the number of factors 
considered in tenure decisions” as one reason for being particularly deferential to such decisions 
made by universities).  The Second Circuit noted that while an “individual’s capacities are 
obviously critical”, there are many other complex factors, and indeed such decisions are often made 
“in the context of generations of scholarly work in the same area and always against a backdrop of 
current scholarship and current reputations of others.”  Id. at 92–93.  See also Kobrin v. Univ. of 
Minn., 34 F.3d 698, 704 n.4 (8th Cir. 1994); Brown v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 346 (1st 
Cir. 1989) (quoting Kumar v. Board of Trs., Univ. of Mass., 774 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1985) (“Courts 
must be extremely wary of intruding into the world of university tenure decisions.  These decisions 
necessarily hinge on subjective judgments regarding the applicant’s academic excellence, teaching 
ability, creativity, contributions to the university community, rapport with students and colleagues, 
and other factors that are not susceptible of quantitative measurement.  Absent discrimination, a 
university must be given a free hand in making such tenure decisions.”); Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d 
839, 847 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Therefore, unless disparities in curricula vitae are so apparent as virtually 
to jump off the page and slap us in the face, we judges should be reluctant to substitute our views 
for those of the individuals charged with the evaluation duty by virtue of their own years of 
experience and expertise in the field in question. ”). 
 344. See discussion supra notes 240–45. 
 345. Villanueva v. Wellesley Coll., 930 F.2d 124, 129 (1st Cir. 1991). 
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F.  The Loss of Individualized Consideration 
Classical liberal approaches to diversity are focused on a holistic evaluation 
of an applicant as a discreet individual.346  One of the “most insidious” aspects 
of the loyalty oaths of the 1950s, was that individuals who held to certain 
ideologies were screened without any further individualized consideration 
whatsoever.347  For a Marxist who refused to lie or hide his beliefs, there was no 
mechanism to attempt to provide nuance or to explain why one’s values were 
ultimately compatible with academic life. 
The focus on “diversity” in the modern academia has a similar homogenizing 
impact.348  This is particularly true in the hiring context where there is no 
meaningful due process or opportunity to contextualize one’s position on 
diversity.  Indeed, applicants for a faculty position will likely never know that 
they were denied a job because of a failing diversity statement.  In the UC pilot 
model, search committees are not even allowed to access any other part of the 
applicant’s file.349  Even outside of the hiring context, if one is opposed to the 
idea of a diversity statement, there is similarly no mechanism for voicing that 
concern without being penalized or potentially excluded from consideration. 
G.  Forced conformity of thought is self-perpetuating 
Viewpoint-based discrimination has an inherent danger of being self-
reinforcing.  As certain ideas are suppressed or excluded from the marketplace 
of ideas, those who continue to operate as gatekeepers to entry into that market 
 
 346. Avi Woolf, A Conservative Definition of Diversity, JAMES G. MARTIN CTR. FOR ACAD. 
RENEWAL (Nov. 29, 2019), https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2019/11/a-conservative-definition-
of-diversity/ (“A conservative who values diversity would seek to understand the individual before 
him—not discounting immutable parts of their person, but not considering them the whole story, 
either.”) 
 347. See Loyalty Oaths, 77 YALE L. J. 739, 739, 766 (1968).  The article discusses how loyalty 
oaths violated due process by allowing the legislature: 
to render a judicial judgment by isolating one group of people on the basis of their 
application for or receipt of a state benefit such as employment, assuming them all 
guilty of misconduct, and then punishing them by denying them the benefit if they fail 
to remove the taint by swearing to an oath. 
Id. at 766. 
 348. Woolf, supra note 346. 
The result of the liberal view of diversity is ironically quite homogenizing—all black 
and brown Americans are a hivemind, all gay men and women have (or should have) 
the same values, working-class people all have the same interests, and so on.  Even 
when more subgroups of diversity are created within liberal-approved groups, they 
tend to be no less uniform.  The old centralizing instinct of modernity, with its exact 
formulas and rigid boundaries, is very much in force. 
Id. 
 349. See discussion supra notes 240–45. 
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will be more likely to see those views as illegitimate.  That is certainly true in 
the academic marketplace of ideas.350 
As such, academic institutions take great pains to avoid allowing ideological 
biases to infect the hiring or tenure review processes.  As Dean Flier has noted: 
During nine years as a medical-school dean, I oversaw nearly a 
thousand professorial reviews assessing the research, teaching, 
service, and reputation of senior members of the faculty.  Maintaining 
the objectivity of these reviews is essential to the integrity of the 
academy, though I fully recognize the imperfections of the process.  
It’s the responsibility of academic leaders to vigorously counter 
inappropriate biases and to guard reviews from ideological 
interference.  This is a surprisingly challenging task, since what 
appears objective to one person may look ideological to another.351 
Unfortunately, the way that diversity statements are being evaluated in the 
University of California does not guard against “ideological interference” 352 
rather, quite the opposite.353  Diversity statements in parts of the University of 
California are expressly being screened based on viewpoints.  The use of 
diversity statements is designed to ensure that only those who think approvingly 
about diversity hiring initiatives are hired.  Those hires are, therefore, by design 
less likely to see concerns with the process and are more likely to be blind to the 
ideological dimensions at work.354  This ideological screening effect is also 
being exacerbated by the fact that many search committees are now being hand 
selected based on sympathy with diversity statements and diversity hiring 
initiatives.355 
 
 350. Professor Bromwich persuasively argues that academic and institutional norms can often 
stifle the exercise of controversial or unpopular ideas, and that the protection of free speech rights 
is, therefore, an essential component of the development of robust academic freedom.  Bromwich 
points to the example of a professor in Israel who spoke out in favor of boycotts for Israel and was 
accused of “forefeit[ing] his ability to work effectively within the academic setting.”  In such 
instances, the First Amendment provides a necessary protection where professional norms of 
academic freedom do not or cannot.  See Bromwich, supra note 22, at 36–38. 
 351. Flier, supra note 12. 
 352. See discussion supra notes 240–45. 
 353. Those who are invited to join the ranks of the administration are often selected primarily 
because they are “uncontroversial” or seen as “team players,” attributes that are particularly 
unlikely to lead to the selection of administrators willing to buck the mold and support academic 
freedom.  Abraham, supra note 318. 
 354. Ironically, it was once progressive scholars who decried disciplinary heterodoxy when it 
was used to devalue the contributions of feminist or critical race scholarship.  See Scott, supra note 
334, at 462–64.  Free speech protections are vital because there is a natural tendency to equate 
“respectability and ideological conventionalism,” and to reject “an expression of dissent from the 
prevailing doctrines of that disciplines.”  Id. at 464 (referencing a 1986 statement by the AAUP). 
 355. Bromwich, supra note 22, at 39.  In such an environment, academic freedom is “helplessly 
vulnerable to abuse,” as “the defenders of academic freedom become the keenest inquisitors on 
behalf of its restrictions.”  Id.  “The searches were, for the most part, open-discipline and open-
rank, and Recruitment Committee members were carefully selected in consultation with the Deans, 
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H  Greater Scrutiny of Extramural Speech 
Unfortunately, there is an alarming trend towards penalizing extramural 
speech or expression.  For instance, a professor at the University of Oregon was 
placed on administrative leave a few years ago for wearing blackface at a 
Halloween party she hosted in her home.356 
As discussed above, there is a generalized consensus that consideration of 
extramural speech is generally inappropriate and poses serious First Amendment 
concerns.357  Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has noted that punishing or retaliating 
against faculty members for their off-campus speech is a particularly pernicious 
violation of academic freedom: “[o]f course, campuses must evaluate the quality 
of a professor’s teaching or scholarship, which inherently involves assessing 
their speech.  But universities must not use a professor’s statements in other 
settings as a basis for ‘excommunicating’ an otherwise qualified professor.”358 
At the moment, there is not yet evidence that UC is looking beyond the four 
corners of the diversity statement when evaluating contributions for diversity.  
However, there is a serious danger that, as the use of these statements continues 
to evolve, the process will expand to encompass extramural speech as search 
committees look through a professor’s social media posts or past publications 
attempting to parse out whether a professor is fully on board with diversity 
initiatives. 
IV.  THE NEED FOR MORE ROBUST PROTECTION FOR PROFESSORIAL SPEECH 
All of these trends show an increasing need for First Amendment protections 
for individual professors.  Evaluations have increasingly shifted away from like-
minded faculty and toward bureaucrats who are less likely to be sympathetic to 
 
with some additional members added by the Vice Provost, based on their past leadership in 
diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives.”  UC OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL REPORT ON THE 
2018−2019 USE OF ONE-TIME FUNDS TO SUPPORT THE BEST PRACTICES IN EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY IN FACULTY EMPLOYMENT, supra note 267, at 20. 
 356. Eugene Volokh, Opinion: At the University of Oregon, no more free speech for professors 
on subjects such as race, religion, sexual orientation, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 
26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/26/at-the-unive
rsity-of-oregon-no-more-free-speech-for-professors-on-subjects-such-as-race-religion-sexual-
orientation/; Josh Blackman, The University of Oregon Ducks the First Amendment, JOSH 
BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Dec. 24, 2016), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2016/12/24/the-university-of-
oregon-ducks-the-first-amendment/; Hans Bader, University of Oregon violates free speech in 
Halloween costume punishment, LIBERTY UNYIELDING (Dec. 25, 2016), https://libertyunyielding.
com/2016/12/25/university-oregon-violates-free-speech-halloween-costume-punishment/. 
 357. See supra Section I.C.3.  The AAUP has long held that when Professors “speak or write 
as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline.”  1940 Statement of 
Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, AAUP 14, https://www.aaup.org/file/1940%20State
ment.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2021). 
 358. Howard Gillman & Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion: Professors are losing their freedom of 
expression, WASH. POST (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/professors-
are-losing-their-freedom-of-expression/2017/11/14/c4c7805a-c594-11e7-afe9-4f60b5a6c4a0_
story.html. 
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free speech concerns.  Institutional protections such as tenure and peer review 
have melted away.  Extramural speech is increasingly being scrutinized under 
the dangerous theory that exposure to controversial ideas may offend or harm 
students who disagree.  Review is increasingly segmented, rather than holistic, 
in its nature.  Ideological conformity is increasingly being portrayed as a virtue 
and even a necessity.  The requirement that applicants for a faculty position write 
a mandatory diversity statement is emblematic of all of these particularly 
dangerous trends.  In this environment, it is more important than ever that the 
First Amendment be utilized as a robust tool to protect academic freedom and 
the rights of professors.359 
For the same reasons, it should be clear that the Garcetti test is woefully 
inadequate.  Under Garcetti, almost anything a professor does or says could be 
swept out of First Amendment protection.  A professor is hired primarily for 
expressive purposes.  Teaching, researching, writing, and public speaking 
events, such as conferences and symposia, are all part of the job responsibilities 
of an academic.360  All of this speech is under increasing scrutiny by bureaucrats 
much more concerned with an ideology of “diversity, equity, and inclusion” than 
a commitment to robust freedom of expression. 
With regard to diversity statements, there are several reasons why the 
application of the Garcetti standard would be particularly inappropriate.  First, 
to the extent that the statements are an inquiry into a professor’s inner mind, it 
cannot be meaningfully said to be the product of one’s employment.  Garcetti 
should have no place in such an evaluation.  Second, in the hiring process what 
is being evaluated is likely teaching and scholarly experience that was produced 
independently or at another institution.  It seems particularly inappropriate to 
apply Garcetti to preexisting experiences or writings.  Indeed, Pickering may 
not even be the right standard to apply to the evaluation of speech that predated 
a job application and was independently produced, and more rigorous standards 
of review should be applied.361  Finally, scholars have persuasively argued that 
 
 359. Ginsberg, supra note 200, at 135 (“[T]he collective notion of academic freedom might 
have been appropriate when applied to, say, a German university, which functioned historically as 
a self-governing body of scholars.  In the American context, though, universities are governed by 
boards and administrators, which may themselves pose a threat to academic freedom.”). 
 360. Hutchens, et al., supra note 301, at 1042 (“Once an institution elects to empower faculty 
to engage in independent speech for purposes of carrying out their professional roles, it should not, 
under the First Amendment, then be able to renege on that grant of professional independence based 
on the public employee speech cases.”). 
 361. See Kimberly K. Caster, Burnham v. Ianni: The Eighth Circuit Forges Protection for the 
Free Speech Rights of Public University Professors Outside The Pickering-Connick-Waters 
Analysis, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 883, 885 (1999).  The Ninth Circuit has refused to apply Pickering 
to a student applying for admission to a university program that could eventually lead to a teaching 
opportunity.  See Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015).  The Ninth Circuit 
explained that applying Pickering in that case would “require us to extend this doctrine to those 
who do not yet work for the government but may wish to do so—a move we have not yet made.”  
Id. at 866.  This case is not entirely analogous, since Oyama was a student.  However, it shows that 
Pickering may not apply in cases where its application would run contrary to the freedom “to 
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Garcetti cannot be the test that applies “where the adverse action is claimed to 
be a product of impermissible content-based or viewpoint-based 
discrimination.”362 
V.  PROPOSING A BETTER STANDARD 
A.  Content v. Viewpoint Discrimination 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that two types of speech 
restrictions raise significant constitutional concerns.  First, content-based 
distinctions that “single[] out specific subject matter for differential 
treatment.”363  Content-based distinctions are frequently suspect because such 
restrictions “appl[y] to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the 
idea or message expressed[,]” and, therefore, may be wielded “to suppress 
disfavored speech.”364  Viewpoint-based distinctions, or distinctions based on 
“‘the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the 
speaker’— is a ‘more blatant’ and ‘egregious form of content 
discrimination.’”365 
In public forums, which are opened up for expression, content-based 
distinctions are treated identically to viewpoint-based distinctions.366  But when 
a forum has not been opened up for generalized expression, the government is 
allowed to make content-based distinctions to “reserve the forum for its intended 
purposes, communicative or otherwise.”367  However, viewpoint-based 
distinctions are invalid even in such non-public forums because such distinctions 
are “an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the 
speaker’s view.”368  This is especially important in higher education because 
“[o]nly when students and faculty are free to examine all options, no matter how 
unpopular or unorthodox, without concern that their careers will be indelibly 
marred by daring to think along nonconformist pathways, can we hope to insure 
an atmosphere in which intellectual pioneers will develop.”369 
In academic settings, some content distinctions are inevitable and required.  
Indeed, some kinds of content distinction help facilitate viewpoint diversity by 
ensuring that limited resources are able to create a diverse academic 
 
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding” that the First Amendment 
extends to students.  Id. at 863 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)). 
 362. Tepper & White, supra note 329, at 165. 
 363. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 169 (2015). 
 364. Id. at 163, 167. 
 365. Id. at 168 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 829 
(1995)). 
 366. Id. at 169. 
 367. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
 368. Id. 
 369. Kunda v. Muhlenberg Coll., 621 F.2d 532, 547 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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community.370  Universities should be able to develop specialized initiatives or 
areas of study such as the University of Chicago’s focus on law and economics, 
BYU’s focus on law and corpus linguistics, or UCLA Law’s specialization in 
critical race studies.371  These kinds of content distinctions are compatible with 
academic freedom and with the First Amendment. 
Even still, content-based distinctions must be evaluated to ensure that they are 
not being used as a smokescreen or cloak for discrimination based on viewpoint.  
At times, the Supreme Court has recognized that what appears to be a content-
based distinction is really a view-point-based distinction in disguise.372  
Viewpoint distinctions must be viewed with significant suspicion for fear of the 
suppression of ideas. 
An example might be helpful.  A university may decide that it wants to hire a 
professor with a specialization in early American History.  This is 
unquestionably a permissible content-based distinction.  On the other hand, a 
public university would be on shaky constitutional ground were it to demand 
that anyone hired for the position must take the viewpoint that the Founding 
Fathers were racists who enacted the Constitution as a tool to perpetuate slavery.  
That would be a viewpoint-based or ideology-based classification that should be 
subjected to intensive scrutiny to ensure that any such classifications are strictly 
necessary to the academic mission of the institution.  This is the same standard 
that is employed in non-public forums more generally, where content 
distinctions are generally permitted, while viewpoint distinctions are forbidden.  
But there is also a danger that content-based categorizations may be operated in 
such a fashion as to de facto create a viewpoint-based distinction.  In this 
hypothetical, for instance, a history department that only allowed historians who 
specialized in a people’s history of disenfranchised and marginal groups to the 
exclusion of any other types of historiography might be using content-based 
distinctions as a smokescreen for viewpoint discrimination. 
Requiring a diversity statement to be part of an application is a type of content-
based requirement that is likely permissible so long as it serves a legitimate 
 
 370. Mac Donald, supra note 253, at 41; Tepper & White, supra note 329, at 166. 
 371. UNIV. CHICAGO, Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics, https://www.law.uchic
ago.edu/coase-sandor (last visited July 16, 2021); BYU L., https://lawcorpus.byu.edu/ (last visited 
July 16, 2021); UCLA L., Critical Race Studies J.D. Specialization, https://law.ucla.edu/acade
mics/degrees/jd-program/specializations/critical-race-studies-jd-specialization (last visited July 
16, 2021). 
 372. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 2234 (2015) (Breyer J., concurring) 
There are cases in which the Court has found content discrimination an 
unconstitutional method for suppressing a viewpoint. . . . And there are cases where 
the Court has found content discrimination to reveal that rules governing a traditional 
public forum are, in fact, not a neutral way of fairly managing the forum in the interest 
of all speakers. 
Justice Breyer cited to several such cases.  E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1988); Police Dept. of Chicago 
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). 
576 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 70:515 
pedagogical purpose.373  However, because content-based distinctions are being 
employed, the evaluation process should be reviewed to make sure that the 
process is not being utilized as a tool for viewpoint discrimination. 
For instance, professors who engage in research deemed to further “economic 
justice” are being rewarded in the University of California.374  In theory, this 
categorization could be employed in a viewpoint neutral fashion.  For instance, 
if a professor argues that classic free-market economics creates a surplus of 
wealth that could benefit all of society and bring more people out of poverty, 
then that could be considered promoting “economic justice.”  But more likely 
that is not how the concept of economic justice is being employed.  Likely, 
scholarship urging more government intervention in the lives of minorities 
would receive credit, while scholarship arguing the contrary position would be 
penalized or ignored.  So this “content-based” distinction has been transformed 
into one that is “view-point based.” 
Some of what the UC schools are doing is simply blatant and overt viewpoint 
discrimination.  As discussed above, any applicant who “[d]efines diversity only 
in terms of different areas of study or different nationalities, but doesn’t discuss 
gender or ethnicity/race,” any candidate who “[m]ay discount the importance of 
diversity” “[m]ay provide reasons for not considering diversity in hiring, or sees 
it as antithetical to academic freedom or the university’s research mission,” or 
“may state that it’s better not to have outreach or affinity groups aimed at 
underrepresented individuals because it keeps them separate from everyone else, 
or will make them feel less valued” would get a failing score.375  That is a clear 
cut example of viewpoint-based discrimination that should be subject to strict 
and exacting scrutiny. 
B.  Factors to Evaluate Content-Based Distinctions 
As suggested above, careful scrutiny is often necessary to determine whether 
a content-based distinction being imposed by a university is viewpoint-based 
discrimination in disguise.  Based on the prior discussion, here are factors that 
courts should take into account when evaluating a content-based distinction 
being imposed by a university.376 
 
 373. Erica Goldberg discusses diversity statements in the context of “compelled speech” cases 
such as Barnette.  Goldberg, supra note 11.  This is a plausible line of attack against diversity 
statements.  But on the other hand, diversity statements are requested as part of an application 
process that involves other prompts for writing personal statements.  It would be difficult to 
distinguish between diversity statements and other requests that are made during the application 
process if diversity statements were truly being applied in a viewpoint neutral manner. 
 374. UCOP Academic Personnel and Programs, Evaluating Contributions to Diversity for 
Faculty Appointment and Promotion Under APM – 210, UC SAN DIEGO 1, 4 (Feb. 2017), https://
www.ucop.edu/faculty-diversity/policies-guidelines/eval-contributions-diversity.pdf. 
 375. Berkley Rubric, supra note 242 at 1; UCSC Rubric, supra note 243 at 1.  
 376. These factors could be taken into account as part of the Pickering analysis when weighing 
the employee’s speech interest against the employer’s interests.  Or perhaps they suggest that a new 
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1.  How related are the requirements to the job description?  – 
Universities may of course impose bona fide job requirements on applicants.  
For instance, an applicant seeking a position in a school of economics cannot be 
aggrieved if he is rejected because he has a degree in psychology or has not 
researched or published in economics.  These kinds of content-based distinctions 
are necessary for creating a high-quality academic community. 
But as the diversity statement shows, there is a grave danger when intellectual 
homogeneity of thought becomes seen as a universal job requirement. 
Those who believe deeply in diversity discourse may argue that the embrace 
of diversity is simply a prerequisite for any academic position at an institution 
that is institutionally committed to ideas of equity and inclusion.  In their mind, 
requiring a strong commitment to diversity is as much a prerequisite as the 
ability to read or write.  As Professor Flier explained, “[o]f course, advocates of 
critical race theory and social justice don’t see the pervasive influence of these 
ideas as a threat to academic freedom, while those who question them often 
do.”377  But this is always so with diversity oaths of any stripes.  Proponents of 
anti-communist loyalty oaths were just as certain that communist could not be 
effective teachers because of their embrace of what they considered to be a 
subversive and dangerous ideology.  Or as John Rosenberg put it, 
A good measure of how far we’ve come is that our new loyalty oaths, 
i.e., diversity statements, are regarded as not only acceptable but 
required by those who would react in horror at similar efforts to 
promote, say, patriotism or capitalism.  Orthodoxy never seems 
orthodox to those intent on imposing it.378 
Some critics of diversity statements have taken the extreme opposite stance 
that “diversity initiatives . . . have nothing whatever to do with the core mission 
of a university: which is intellectual excellence in the pursuit of truth via 
teaching and research.” 379  A more nuanced position is certainly possible.  One 
can acknowledge, for instance, that a university may unquestionably ensure that 
every faculty member is willing to treat each and every student with respect.  But 
one can also recognize that the diversity statements at UC go far beyond that and 
impose a requirement that faculty members not only agree with university policy 
but zealously embrace the university’s perspective.  This requirement is far 
removed from any traditional metrics of academic excellence or teaching 
performance and detached from any direct job responsibilities, increasing the 
risk of discrimination and the suppression of ideas. 
 
test rather than Pickering should instead be developed to more appropriately assess the various 
interests in this context. 
 377. Flier, supra note 12. 
 378. John Rosenberg, From Diverse Professors to Professors of Diversity, JAMES G. MARTIN 
CTR. FOR ACAD. RENEWAL (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.jamesgmartin.center/2018/12/from-
diverse-professors-to-professors-of-diversity/. 
 379. John E.R. Staddon, Is Diversity an Enemy of Excellence?, INTELL. TAKEOUT (Feb. 13, 
2019), https://www.intellectualtakeout.org/article/diversity-enemy-excellence. 
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Or put simply, novel requirements that are not clearly tied to job 
responsibilities should be approached with greater suspicion than those 
traditional requirements of a profession that are closely linked to job duties.380 
2.  Is this a universal requirement for all faculty or a limited requirement for 
narrowly crafted faculty positions? 
As a closely related matter, there is a difference between a qualification for a 
specific discipline or position, and a qualification that applies to all applicants 
for all positions writ large.  Requiring a certain kind of perspective and expertise 
for a narrowly crafted position in a single department would be less likely to risk 
suppression of ideas.  On the other hand, a broad mandate that all candidates for 
all positions must satisfy is much more likely to result in a homogenous faculty 
and the suppression of ideas. 
The history of loyalty oaths is instructive on this point.  The loyalty oaths of 
the 1950s were not concerned merely with whether a professor was teaching 
classical or Marxian economics in his or her economics classroom.  Instead, they 
were systematic in their nature and took the form of imputing guilt by mere 
association with a set of ideas.381  A Communist was not merely barred from 
teaching economics, but from teaching at all.382  While either of these policies 
would raise serious First Amendment concerns, the total ban was even more 
problematic because it excluded anyone who disagreed from the academy 
altogether. 
Diversity statements at the University of California are akin to the 1950s 
loyalty oaths in this respect.  A professor who holds classical liberal positions 
on diversity issues is not merely barred from teaching a course on sociology or 
on the Fourteenth Amendment, but from holding any position in the academy at 
all.  This restriction applies with as much force to fields that tangentially touch 
on diversity policy, such as the hard sciences or engineering, as they do to the 
social sciences or humanities.  Indeed, it is the hard sciences at UC schools that 
appear to be most forcefully embracing the use of diversity statements.383  The 
universal scope of the modern diversity statement is, therefore, one of its more 
egregious facets. 
 
 380. The Fifth Circuit in Wetherbe suggested that in the hiring context a university should be 
particularly free to conduct a broad inquiry and to “screen applicants to ensure that they will 
actually perform their duties with maximal diligence.”  Wetherbe v. Smith, 593 F. App’x 323, 329 
(5th Cir. 2014).  But the Court also seemed to acknowledge that how closely related the question 
was “to the positon that the applicant is seeking” would make a big difference in how much 
deference the institution is due.  Id. at 329 n.8.  Even though the Fifth Circuit panel erred perhaps 
too far on the side of deference in the case, I agree with it that this is a critical consideration for 
determining how much deference is appropriate. 
 381. Loyalty Oaths, supra note 347, at 764. 
 382. Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 489, 496 (1952). 
 383. See supra note 230, at 3 and accompanying text.  Note how many of the pilot programs 
are in the hard sciences or disciplines that are seen as more empirical like Mathematics. 
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Litmus tests that apply uniformly to all academic positions closely resemble 
the anti-communist loyalty oaths and should raise judicial alarm bells 
necessitating greater skepticism and scrutiny. 
3.  Are privately held ideas being evaluated, or only outward conduct? 
The idea that a professor may be punished because of his personally held 
beliefs rather than his outward conduct is particularly pernicious.  After all, “[i]f 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein.”384 
Public universities should be squarely forbidden from considering and 
discriminating against privately held beliefs that are not expressed in public.  
University search committees are not allowed to be a thought police.  Diversity 
statements come close to this line by requiring Professors to make an affirmative 
ideological pledge and by penalizing anyone not willing to make that pledge.  
Silence or indifference is an inadequate response as full intellectual assent is 
required.  These kinds of requirements should be scrutinized particularly strictly. 
Similarly pernicious is the effort to equate the expression of ideas with 
discriminatory conduct.  The example of Richard Sander, a Professor at UCLA 
law, is instructive.  Sander is a well-known critic of affirmative action programs 
and an advocate for the theory of mismatch (the theory that affirmative action 
harms minority students by placing them in schools that do not match their skills, 
therefore, setting them up for failure).  As a result, minority students in the law 
program erupted at perceived slights, such as Sander’s first-year property law 
class printing t-shirts with his name on them for a softball competition.  Some 
students also complained that they might not feel comfortable seeking help from 
Sander because they would not want to confirm his research regarding 
mismatch.385  Supporters of diversity programs might point to Sander as proof 
that a professor who is not personally committed to diversity outreach programs 
may not be capable to teaching a diverse mixture of students. 
Accepting this premise is insulting to the intelligence and capability of 
students at schools like UCLA Law.  There are no indicators that Sander ever 
discriminated against a single student or treated a single student in an inferior 
fashion as a result of race.  Accordingly, those who support excluding professors 
like Sander must embrace one of two claims, which are both dangerous to 
academic freedom and the First Amendment. 
First, students cannot be expected to distinguish between an empirically based 
theory that has received recognition from members of the Supreme Court386 and 
 
 384. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 385. See Mac Donald, supra note 253 at 72. 
 386. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 372 (2003) (Thomas J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The Law School tantalizes unprepared students with the promise of a 
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outright racism.  Second, students cannot be expected to learn from a professor 
with whom they disagree sharply. 
With regard to the first claim, equating serious academic theories with 
outright racism is corrosive to intellectual diversity on campus and in the public 
square.  Students are, of course, free to disagree with Professor Sander and 
debate the merits of his theory.  But disagreement, even heated disagreement, is 
not equal to racial harassment or hatred.  The university, a place committed to 
the pursuit of truth, is precisely where such narrow-minded thinking should be 
confronted and rejected. 
The second claim is empirically unfounded, as black students in Professor 
Sander’s property section have actually performed better than students in other 
first-year sections.387  Moreover, it once again betrays a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the purpose of higher education as a place where students 
are exposed to a diversity of perspectives and given the opportunity to think, 
reason, and learn. 
The example of Richard Sander shows that university officials may attempt 
to argue that certain viewpoints regarding diversity programs must be excluded 
because their presence in the academy will cause offense, prejudice, and lead 
minority students to feel unsafe or insecure.  As Professor Eugene Volokh has 
argued, “if accepted, these arguments really will be the end of freedom of 
expression—both casual and more formally academic—on university 
professors’ part[.]”388  Embracing this kind of thinking will create a “student’s 
veto” akin to the “heckler’s veto” that has been repeatedly rejected by the 
Supreme Court and lower courts.389  Even under the Pickering test, courts have 
 
University of Michigan degree and all of the opportunities that it offers.  These overmatched 
students take the bait, only to find that they cannot succeed in the cauldron of competition.  And 
this mismatch crisis is not restricted to elite institutions.”); Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 570 
U.S. 297, 333, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2432, 186 L. Ed. 2d 474 (2013) (Scalia J., concurring) 
(“Furthermore, the University’s discrimination does nothing to increase the number of blacks and 
Hispanics who have access to a college education generally.  Instead, the University’s 
discrimination has a pervasive shifting effect.  See T. Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World 
145–146 (2004).  The University admits minorities who otherwise would have attended less 
selective colleges where they would have been more evenly matched.  But, as a result of the 
mismatching, many blacks and Hispanics who likely would have excelled at less elite schools are 
placed in a position where underperformance is all but inevitable because they are less academically 
prepared than the white and Asian students with whom they must compete.  Setting aside the 
damage wreaked upon the self-confidence of these overmatched students, there is no evidence that 
they learn more at the University than they would have learned at other schools for which they were 
better prepared.  Indeed, they may learn less.”) 
 387. Id. at 73−74. 
 388. Eugene Volokh, Silencing professor speech to prevent students from being offended – or 




 389. See Forsyth Cty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 142 (1992) (Rehnquist J., 
dissenting) (criticizing a decision for “resulting in the kind of ‘heckler’s veto’ we have previously 
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held that “threatened disruption by others reacting to public employee speech 
simply may not be allowed to serve as justification for public employer 
disciplinary action directed at that speech.”390  That protection against a 
heckler’s veto is even more vital in academia, which has served as an incubator 
for unpopular or controversial ideas.391 
In Rodriguez v. Maricopa County Community College District, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected a racial harassment claim brought by students against a college 
that failed to discipline a professor who wrote emails to an employee list server 
extolling the virtue of white culture and critiquing multiculturalism and 
diversity.392  The Court discussed how “[f]ree speech has been a powerful 
force for the spread of equality under the law” and “we must not squelch that 
freedom because it may also be harnessed by those who promote retrograde or 
unattractive ways of thought.”393  Accordingly, the Court emphasized that not 
only was the University not required to punish the professor, but also it could 
not do so, because his “speech would be singled out for suppression because of 
his disfavored opinions on those issues.”394  The Court emphasized that 
“listeners who are offended by the ideas being discussed certainly are not 
entitled to shut down an entire forum simply because they object to what some 
people are saying” because otherwise, “very soon no one would be able to say 
much of anything at all.”395 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez is correct.  The First Amendment 
has always stood for the principle that the proper response to controversial ideas 
is counter speech rather than suppression or coercion.  Academic institutions 
must resist the tendency to equate offensive speech with harassment or the 
creation of an unsafe academic environment, because this equivalency will result 
in the destruction of meaningful First Amendment protections.  Courts must be 
particularly vigilant in rejecting attempts to offer this kind of false equivalency. 
 
condemned”); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235, 237–38 (1963); Terminiello v. 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949).  See also Daniel Ortner, The Terrorist’s Veto: Why the First 
Amendment Must Protect Provocative Portrayals of the Prophet Muhammad, 12 NW. J. L. & SOC. 
POL’Y. 1, 31–32 (2016) (discussing how courts have protected provocative speech against a 
heckler’s veto in order to prevent viewpoint discrimination against those views that are 
controversial enough to provoke a heated response). 
 390. Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985).  See also Flanagan v. Munger, 
890 F. 2d 1557, 1566 (10th Cir. 1989) (“The department cannot justify disciplinary action against 
plaintiffs simply because some members of the public find plaintiffs’ speech offensive and for that 
reason may not cooperate with law enforcement officers in the future.”); Dible v. City of Chandler, 
515 F.3d 918, 934 (9th Cir. 2008) (Canby J., concurring). 
 391. Blackman, supra note 356. 
 392. Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 605 F.3d 703, 705−06 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 393. Id. at 709–10. 
 394. Id. at 710–11. 
 395. Id. at 711. 
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Policies targeting internal thought or extramural speech should be scrutinized 
with particular rigor.  Courts must reject any encroachment of the heckler’s veto 
into academia. 
4.  Are the criterion being employed widely held and reliably applicable? 
When the criterion for evaluating scholarship are widely held and objectively 
applied, it reduces the risk of subjectivity and viewpoint discrimination.  For 
instance, consider a professor who embraced the universally discredited theory 
that the Holocaust did not occur.  An institution that would exclude such a 
professor would have recourse to “the disciplinary protocols of history 
departments”, which could be brought to bear to show why the Holocaust denial 
scholarship was defective or invalid.396  These same norms could be applied to 
future applicants in a consistent and verifiable fashion.  Those norms would also 
remain subject to criticism or revision if new information came to light.  Other 
objective measures could also be utilized, such as the placement of academic 
publications or the reviews that a publication has received from peers.  The 
utilization of such objective professional norms helps insulate academic review 
from the risk of viewpoint discrimination.397  While academic norms are 
certainly not entirely free from the bias, they are a vital protection for academic 
freedom and free speech rights. 
In contrast, there are no meaningful institutional norms that can be brought to 
bear to evaluate something like a mandatory diversity statement.398 
As Dean Flier explained: 
Most in the academic community, including myself, see efforts toward 
greater diversity and inclusion as essential to the core commitments of 
a humane and liberal society, such as eliminating inappropriate 
barriers, creating equal opportunity, and displaying tolerance and 
respect for group differences.  But the key terms — diversity, equity, 
and inclusion — are rarely defined with specificity, and their meaning 
has been subtly shifting.  That’s a serious problem, especially if 
diversity efforts are to be a criterion for faculty evaluation.  The term 
“equity,” for instance, can imply equality of opportunity or equality of 
outcome — two quite different things with distinct policy 
implications.  The concept of “inclusion” might imply the welcoming 
of diverse groups and perspectives, or it might involve the avoidance 
 
 396. Bérubé, supra note 101. 
 397. See Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(explaining that universities must be allowed to use “lawful criteria” for evaluation but that this 
criteria “can be examined for an impermissible discriminatory use”); See also Joseph J. Martins, 
supra note 160 ) (analyzing Adams). 
 398. Samia E. McCall, Thinking Outside of the Race Boxes: A Two-Pronged Approach to 
Further Diversity and Decrease Bias, 2018 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 23, 58 (2018) (“The reading and 
scoring of a diversity statement is subject to the bias, both implicit and explicit, of the admissions 
committees.”). 
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of microaggressions and the creation of safe spaces — two 
controversial goals.  The lack of definitional clarity of key terms 
creates confusion, suspicion, and disagreement.399 
This “confusion, suspicion, and disagreement” is exacerbated by the fact that 
terms like “equity” or “diversity” may mean very different things in different 
academic disciplines.  Therefore, attempting to craft a single objective and 
overarching definition for terms like “diversity, equity, and inclusion” is likely 
to be elusive.  This means that there is a lot more room for subjectivity and 
viewpoint bias to infect the process.  There is also, somewhat ironically, concern 
that because notions of diversity, equity, and inclusion vary between cultures 
that the use of mandatory diversity statements will prejudice international 
scholars. 
When universities utilize criterion that are highly subjective and are not 
subject to institutional and professional norms, their determinations should be 
treated with greater suspicion. 
5.  Is the review holistic or a threshold test? 
As already discussed, holistic review minimizes the risk that viewpoint is used 
as a predominant factor in consideration.400  The presence of holistic review may 
also be constitutionally significant. 
In Bakke, the Supreme Court invalidated UC’s affirmative action program 
because of “its disregard of individual rights” and the lack of individualized 
holistic consideration.401  Although diversity statements do not utilize quotas or 
caps, there is something quite similar at work when a university prioritizes a 
contribution to diversity to the exclusion of other factors as UC schools have 
done in their diversity pilot programs.  No matter what else an applicant could 
bring to the university community, be it brilliant academic insight, award 
winning teaching experience, or dedicated university service, it will not be 
enough to outweigh the lack of a conforming diversity statement.  The 
University of California may ignore “the next Albert Einstein or Jonas Salk” if 
he fails to parrot the diversity orthodoxy.402 
Defenders of the diversity statement may argue that evaluation of the diversity 
statement is in and of itself holistic with a variety of factors, such as teaching 
and research, being considered.  But that does not change the fact that a professor 
who prioritized academics or teaching rather than diversity efforts because she 
believes that the university’s diversity efforts are harmful may not be considered 
at all regardless of merit. 
 
 399. Flier, supra note 12. 
 400. See discussion supra Section III.F. 
 401. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978). 
 402. Ortner, supra note 12.  See also Heather Mac Donald, Op-Ed: UCLA’s Infatuation With 
Diversity is a Costly Diversion from its True Mission, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2018), https://www.la
times.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mac-donald-diversity-ucla-20180902-story.html. 
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Holistic consideration of a candidate minimizes the risk that any single item 
will be taken as a litmus test, while a single-focused review raises concerns about 
an intellectual inquisition. 
6.  Who is doing the evaluation, faculty, or administrators? 
In the Supreme Court’s academic freedom precedent described above, many 
of its cases involved academic institutions being buffeted by administrative 
forces, such as school boards.  In this context, it made sense to speak about the 
academic freedom rights of academic institutions.  After all, it was reasonable 
to assume that academic institutions would be far more solicitous of academic 
freedom rights and of the First Amendment than faceless government 
bureaucrats who were largely detached from the academy.403  When professional 
academics are in charge, it is far more likely that they will impose the objective 
and professional standards of their profession in evaluating applicants.404 
As the professionalization and bureaucratization of the academy continues 
apace, it may no longer make sense to think about the administration of a 
university as being an ally for faculty academic freedom.405  To the contrary, 
these diversity bureaucrats and other administrative officials more fully 
resemble the school board officials who were time and again rebuked by the 
Supreme Court in their efforts to stifle academic freedom.406 
Accordingly, Courts should consider treating policies that are being primarily 
pushed by bureaucrats and other non-academics with far more skepticism than 
they traditionally have treated faculty policies and procedures. 
 
 403. See Pomona Coll. v. Superior Ct., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662, 667–68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
Only one group of people is suited to undertake the responsibility of making these 
decisions: the candidate’s academic peers who are knowledgeable about the 
candidate’s chosen field of study and about the particular needs of the institution.  
These peers, unlike non-academics, are equipped to evaluate the candidate’s teaching 
and research according to their conformity with methodological principles agreed upon 
by the entire academic community.  They also have the knowledge to meaningfully 
evaluate the candidate’s contributions within his or her particular field of study as well 
as the relevance of those contributions to the goals of the particular institution.  
Moreover, because their individual academic reputations are intertwined with that of 
the university, the candidate’s peers have the greatest stake in choosing people whose 
future work will reflect favorably on the institution. 
 404. See supra Sections III.C & III.D. 
 405. Ginsberg, supra note 200, at 135 (“[T]he collective notion of academic freedom might 
have been appropriate when applied to, say, a German university, which functioned historically as 
a self-governing body of scholars.  In the American context, though, universities are governed by 
boards and administrators, which may themselves pose a threat to academic freedom.”). 
 406. Richard H. Hiers, Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: O Say, Does 
That Star-Spangled First Amendment Banner Yet Wave?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1993) 
(criticizing the tendency to take the Court’s language regarding academic freedom “out of context 
. . . to imply that universities themselves, or their administrative officials, have a right to ‘academic 
freedom’ that courts should respect even when such officials’ authority is exercised to the detriment 
of the interests of mere ‘faculty,’ including faculty interests in academic freedom.”). 
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7.  Is the application of the standard likely to stifle or suppress the diversity 
of thought on the faculty and on campus? 
All of the aforementioned factors point to this overarching question: is the 
application of a particular content or viewpoint-based standard likely to stifle or 
suppress diversity of thought on the faculty and on campus?  Stifling diversity 
of thought is particularly likely when viewpoint discrimination is involved.  It is 
also more likely when review is based on factors far removed from core job 
performance requirements, is applied to all positions indiscriminately, involves 
the evaluation of thought and ideas rather than conduct, is not based on objective 
disciplinary norms, is singularly focused rather than holistic in nature, and is 
applied by bureaucrats who are especially unlikely to be protective of freedom 
of thought and expression. 
All of these factors are present in the case of how the University of California 
is utilizing mandatory diversity statements.  Accordingly, these statements are 
particularly dangerous to diversity of thought and freedom of expression in the 
academy.  Accordingly, Courts should closely scrutinize these diversity 
statements and require universities to offer a compelling and narrowly tailored 
justification for requiring applicants to complete such statements.407 
  
 
 407. It is highly unlikely that a university will succeed in providing adequate support for 
justifying such programs.  Diversity in higher education has been deemed a compelling interest, 
but the Court has rejected that rationale in other contexts such as in secondary education.  Parents 
Involved in Cmty.  Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).724–725, 730 (plurality 
opinion).  While the university clearly has an interest in ensuring that diverse students are 
welcomed, it can likely achieve that goal in more rights protective ways, such as punishing 
professors who discriminate against students based on protected characteristics.  An overarching 
system of content and viewpoint discrimination is not even close to a narrowly tailored solution. 
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APPENDIX A: UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, OFFICE OF THE VICE 












 408. Reprinted with the permission of the University of California, Davis. 




OFFICE OFTHEVICE PROVOST –ACADEMICAFFAIRS
AGENDA
 Overviewand goals of these searches (VP Kass)
 A discussion with STEAD (STEAD members)
 Search Committee Expectations andTimeline (VP Kass)
 Rubrics (AVPPickett)
 Discussion/Q&A
















 The call from UCOP – a URM initiative
 Goals of this search process
 Funds are from the State Legislature
 Constraints (time and otherwise)
 Use of Contributions to DiversityStatements first
 The publicity receivedso far (example next slide)
 UCR’ssuccess (example in two slides)
“So now they are literally saying that research and scholarship is 
less important to the mission of a university than "diversity" is.”
“In essence this program is a racial quota program and so illegal 
under California law.The main criteria for selection is your race.”
“Requiring such statements in applications for appointments and 
promotions is an affront to academic freedom,and diminishes the 
true value of diversity,equity of inclusion by trivializing it.”
“As part of coming to your view that diversity statements 
trivialize diversity,did you listen to STEM PoC,women,LGBTQ 
voices? Because they don't seem to agree with you.”
“… how does a statement describing ones efforts towards 
diversity affect academic freedom? I also had to make statements 
about my teaching philosophyand research approach for tenure 
and my freedom survived.”















UC RIVERSIDE: EXPERIENCE WITH THEIR COLLEGE OF 
ENGINEERING
A DISCUSSIONWITH STEAD















EXPECTATIONSOF SEARCH COMMITTEE MEMBERS
 Doing more than the usual
 Right now – need to nail down our advertising priorities
 Need members to use their free listserves to get the word out
 Need members to develop lists of names of URM individuals and contact them
 Serve as ambassadors for this process
 Renaming excellence
 Valuing contributions to diversity,why this matters
 Legally consistent with Proposition 209
TIMELINE & PROCESS
 Plan to post these positions by January 15,open through Feb 15.
 Between now and Feb.15,Committees can work on finalizing their rubrics for 
evaluating the Contributions to Diversity Statements (CDS).
 Starting February 16,Committees will initially only be provided with all candidates’ 
CDS for review.Committees should be meeting by the end of February.
 Following this review,Committees will meet in person to consider who is on the 
“Seriously Consider” list,possible Skype interviews,come up with a Shortlist.
 Interviews should occur in March,by mid-March.
 Deans should be working on a list of who should be meeting the candidates during 
the campus visit.















TIMELINE & PROCESS (CONTINUED)
 Confidential advisors (2) – completely separate from the process,and available to all 
candidates who are invited to campus. One from sciences (for CAES, CBS, ENG, 
VET),one from social sciences/humanities(for GSM,SOE,LAW).
 After final interviews, we will build in time for faculty to provide feedback to the 
Committee. Committee provides their feedback to the dean. (For those 
schools/colleges with departments,the dean will work with departments to consider 
placement.Dean and selected department/chair need to be strong advocates.)
 April – Dean begins negotiations with the top candidate.



















HOW DOES THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DEFINE “DIVERSITY?”
 TheAcademic Senate adopted in 2009 the following broad definition of diversity:
Diversity - features of California past, present and future refers to a variety of 
personal experiences,values,and worldviews that arise from differences of culture 
and circumstance. Such differences include race, ethnicity, gender, age, religion, 
language, abilities/disabilities, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, geographic 
region and more.
PURPOSE OF THE DIVERSITY STATEMENT:
•Underscores campus role as a public land grant research 
university serving residents of the state.
•Aligns with academic personnel policy to encourage and 
recognize faculty contributions to diversity.
•Reinforces campus strategic goal of increasing faculty 
participation in diversity,equity,and inclusion activities.
•Communicates inclusive excellence as a faculty 
expectation for all applicants.
•Complements researchand teaching interests of 
applicants and augments skills and competencies.















IS THE DIVERSITY STATEMENT CONSISTENT WITH UNIVERSITY OF 
CALIFORNIA POLICY?
Yes.
APM 210.1-d which governs appointment, appraisal and promotion, recommends 
that faculty be both encouraged and rewarded for activity that promotes inclusive 
excellence:
“The University of California is committed to excellence and equity in every facet of its 
mission.Teaching, research, professional and public service contributions that promote 
diversity and equal opportunity are to be encouraged and given recognition in the 
evaluation of the candidate's qualifications. These contributions to diversity and 
equal opportunity can take a variety of forms including efforts to advance 
equitable access to education, public service that addresses the needs of 
California's diverse population, or research in a scholar's area of expertise 
that highlights inequities.”
WHAT SHOULD A DIVERSITY STATEMENTACCOMPLISH?
 Indicateawareness of inequitiesand challenges in
education faced by historically underrepresentedor
economically disadvantaged groups, and the negative
consequencesof underutilization
 Demonstrate a track record and measure of 
success in activities (such as mentoring, teaching or 
outreach) that aim to reduce barriers in education or 
research for underrepresented or economically 
disadvantaged groups
 Describe specific plans to contribute through 
campus programs,new activities,or throughnational 
or off-campus organizations

















 Tend to be substantial in length (e.g.,2 - 3 pages)
 Clearly address all three criteria: Understanding,track record, 
and plans
 Demonstrate sophisticated thinking about the 
underrepresentation of groups in academia and structural 
barriers to success (e.g., racism,sexism,homophobia,etc.)
 Provide detailed information about activities, including their 
specific role in the activity and the outcomes
 Typicallycontain descriptions of multiple efforts rather than 
only one or two
 Have an established track record going back many years
 Provide clear and convincing evidence of how they would 
contribute at UC Davis
 Reference activities or programs currently taking place at UC 
Davis and how they would become involved or fill other needs
Weakstatements:
 Tendto be brief in length
 Are often vague (e.g.,“diversity is important for the success 
of science”)
 Describe participating in few activities
 Participated only peripherally in activities
 Show only a simplistic understanding of equity and inclusion 
issues
 Describe efforts to be undertaken that are generally 
already expected of faculty (e.g., being welcoming to all 
students, making the classroom a positive environment, 
having women among advisees, etc)
 Expecting UC Davis to provide opportunities for the 
candidate to get involved rather than proposing activities 
or programs
TIPS FOR SEARCH COMMITTEES
 Make sure you haveconsidered how much weight your committee wants to assign to a candidate’sknowledge 
of,experience with,and/or commitment to diversity,equity,and inclusion in relation to other areas.
 When reviewing statements,notice candidates’ level of reliance on generalities,platitudes,and clichés. 
Are their statements generic and perfunctory,or more detailed and specific to the individual?
 Notice whether candidates describe concrete experiences—working in a specific outreach program in a 
specific community,serving as aTAor instructor in a specific course,tutoring diverse students in a particular 
summer program,conductingfield research in a particular community,and so on.
 Also notice the level of candidates’ commitments—how often have they been involved in these types of 
opportunities,and/or how long havethey worked in particular areas?
 If candidates have not had many opportunities to work in these areas in the past, can they describe their 
potential for future contributions to diversity and inclusion in concrete and specific detail?
 Return to your assessment rubric:how well do candidates’ experiences,aspirations,and potential match up 
with your required or preferred qualities?















A SAMPLE RUBRIC: UC IRVINE
SAMPLE STATEMENT#1
































USING STATEMENTSAS PARTOF OVERALL EVALUATION
 Consider creating a cut-off score for advancing 
equity and inclusion,below which a candidate would 
not move forward in the search process (would be 
considered“below the bar”),regardless of their 
scores in other areas,similar to what would be 
done for researchquality or plans.
 Set a high bar.













These are included in your packet:
 Guidance from UCOP on evaluating Contributions to Diversity Statements: 
http://facultydiversity.ucsd.edu/recruitment/C2D%20Guidelines_UCOP.pdf
 UC Irvine Evaluation Grid: 
http://archive.advance.uci.edu/Advance/ADVANCE%20PDFs/DiversityEval.xlsx
 UC Berkeley Rubric: 
https://ofew.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/rubric_to_assess_candidate_contributions_to_div
ersity_equity_and_inclusion.pdf
 UC DavisAcademicAffairs: 
https://academicaffairs.ucdavis.edu/faculty-equity-and-inclusion
DISCUSSION/QUESTIONS
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